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In Defense of the Global Regulation of a “Duty
to Report Crime”
Dr. Sungyong Kang †
I. INTRODUCTION
In a previous article, “In Defense of Duty to Report Crime,” a
normative case was made for domestic “duty to report crime” laws that
criminalize certain private actors for their failure to report crimes. 1 The
basic point in that article was that such laws are justified under a moral
culpability analysis. It was argued there that in some circumstances, an
offender, 2 a third-party observer, or even a victim has a strong moral duty
to inform the relevant authorities that a potentially criminal act has been
committed. In that earlier article, it was also asserted that existing
domestic laws that promulgate a “duty to report crime” are justifiable, or
can be revised to reflect this normative framework.
This article will build upon the prior analysis of domestic “duty to
report crime” laws by describing and analyzing what can be done at the
international level with “duty to report crime” laws. The analysis put
forward in the previous article is taken as a given, namely, that there is a
moral, normative case for “duty to report crime” laws.
This article consists of four parts. Part I sets out the parameters of
the problem by employing a hypothetical example which we will return to
throughout the analysis in succeeding parts of the paper. Part II discusses
the taxonomy of crime with a tripartite classification and then discusses
the methods of analysis for analyzing efficiency as well as providing an
overview of the inadequacy of the current international regime. Part III
sets out a legislative blueprint for the global regulation of a “duty to report
† S.J.D., Attorney at Law licensed in New York, Researcher at Police Science Institute (South Korea).
I wish to thank Thomas Lee, Sean Griffith, and Youngjae Lee for their helpful comments to this paper.
1. Dr. Sungyong Kang, In Defense of Duty to Report Crime, 86 UMKC L. REV. (forthcoming
2018).
2. Id. at 363 (“‘Offender-reporter’, as used here, means only the person, including a legal entity,
with possible strict vicarious criminal liability for such entity, not the person who commits or aids and
abets the underlying crime with general criminal liability. To differentiate between these two types of
offenders, I use ‘Offender’ for the former and ‘Primary Offender’ for the latter. Also, Offender does
not include a person who has no liability in relation to the crime committed within their organization.
As only the person who can control and oversee the behavior of Primary Offender bears possible strict
vicarious criminal liability, a person without such control or oversight will be considered a third
party.”).
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crime” and suggests three key criteria, all of which must be met for global
regulation to be effective. Finally, Part IV provides a conclusion and a
rationale as to why this legislative blueprint can and should be
implemented.
Crimes in the current global-digital era increasingly defy purely
domestic “duty to report crime” laws. The characteristics of such crimes
are “global-digital” as opposed to “local-physical”; they take the form of
multinational networks of criminals exploiting digitalized services of such
things as financial institutions and Internet Service Providers (“ISP”),
They do this to transport illicit money, 4 child
among others. 3
5
pornography, and private information6 across national borders, and to
incite violence and terrorist acts around the world. 7 Domestic laws and
enforcement institutions are quite simply inadequate to detect and deter
the full range of global-digital crimes. Moreover, horizontal cooperation
at the state-to-state level alone is inadequate in the global-digital context.
To detect, punish, and deter some (or most) crimes in today’s era of
hyper-globalization and digitization, high degrees of coordination along
two dimensions are necessary: both horizontally, state-to-state, and
vertically, between state entities and choke point 8 private actors. 9 In this
article we shall refer to the combination of these two dimensions as
“transnational vertical” cooperation. It is “vertical” insofar as it requires
cooperation between choke point private actors who report crime to the
state (“bottom-up”) and the state to provide the required information to the
choke point private actors (“top-down”), which it, in part, acquires from
3. See Louise I. Shelley, Crime and Corruption in the Digital Age, 51 J. OF INT’L AFF. 605, 605
(1998).
4. Luke Harding et al., British Banks Handled Vast Sums of Laundered Russian Money,
GUARDIAN (Mar. 20 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/mar/20/british-banks-handledvast-sums-of-laundered-russian-money [https://perma.cc/NN9R-TPZX].
5.Anastasia Moloney, Child Sex Traffickers Turn to Rural Areas, Internet for Business, REUTERS
(Sept. 19, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-global-slavery-sexcrimes/child-sex-traffickersturn-to-rural-areas-internet-for-business-idUSKCN1BU25M [https://perma.cc/P9N8-KSZB].
6. Ruby Kitchen & Chris Burn, Details of a Million People Across Yorkshire for Sale on
‘Darkweb’, YORKSHIRE POST, (July 25, 2017), http://www.yorkshirepost.co.uk/news/details-of-amillion-people-across-yorkshire-for-sale-on-dark-web-1-8668876 [https://perma.cc/SVJ8-QTB9].
7. Michael Jacobson, Terrorist Financing on the Internet, 2 CTC SENTINEL 17, 17–20 (2009),
https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/opeds/4a438817e3a3c.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6CTZ-JF7B].
8. The dictionary definition of choke point is “[a] point of congestion or blockage.” Choke
Point, OXFORD LIVING DICTIONARY, https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/choke_point
[https://perma.cc/5BDP-BN6Q]. The choke point in this paper refers to a point of blockage to deter
crime.
9. This paper generalizes and theorizes the argument made in a prior research paper concerning
global regulation of a duty to report suspicious activities imposed on financial institutions to deter
corruption and money laundering. See Dr. Sungyong Kang, Rethinking the Global Anti-Money
Laundering Regulations to Deter Corruption: A Model for Public-Private Cooperation 2 (Feb. 5, 2018)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with the International & Comparative Law Quarterly) (“AML/PEP
regulation could avoid, or at least minimize, the collateral damage while maximizing corruption
deterrence, if high degrees of coordination along two dimensions were satisfied: the trans-border, and
between public enforcement entities and private actors.”).
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other states.
This article aims to show that “transnational vertical” cooperation is
necessary to ensure optimal levels of deterrence for the types of “super”
harms that justify domestic laws to criminalize the failure to report crime
in the first place, as these harms are increasingly committed in a
networked global-digital manner in the modern era. It is not simply a case
of doing a “better” job of, for example, deterring corruption or terrorism;
this kind of cooperation may even be essential to addressing such harms.
A hypothetical example will assist our understanding of the problem.
Two foreign terrorists plan to hijack a flight from Charles de Gaulle
Airport in Paris to Kuala Lumpur International Airport in Malaysia,
intending to crash the flight into the Stade de France in Saint-Denis during
a football match. As they are known foreign terrorists listed on an
International Criminal Police Organization (“INTERPOL”) database,10
they buy Austrian and Italian passports stolen in Thailand in 2012 and
2013 on the black market. They open bank accounts with BNP Paribas in
Paris using the stolen passports, and their terrorist organization wires
money to those accounts to finance aviation school education. On the
appointed day of their attack, the foreign terrorists enter Charles de Gaulle
Airport, check in for their flight, and pass through the security check.
However, at the exit control, the immigration officers disrupt the
terrorists’ plot and save the lives of hundreds, maybe thousands, of
civilians, due to a positive match on INTERPOL’s Stolen and Lost
Travelling Document (“SLTD”) database. 11
This story is fictional, but many of the details are real and
recognizable. In 2001, terrorists with links to Al-Qaeda hijacked four
domestic commercial flights and crashed two of those planes into the
World Trade Center in New York. In 2015, foreign Islamic State terrorist
fighters, who were returning from Syria, carried out suicide bombings and
mass shootings in Paris. Furthermore, even though there is no established
connection with terrorism, 12 it is well-known that Malaysia Airlines Flight
10. See Press Release, Information Sharing is a ‘Tripwire’ Against Foreign Terrorist Fighters,
INTERPOL (Feb 19, 2015), http://www.interpol.int/News-and-media/News/2015/N2015-015
[https://perma.cc/QM7M-R4VF] (“[C]lose to 40 countries have already provided information to
INTERPOL on more than 1,500 suspected and confirmed fighters linked to Syria and Iraq.”); id.
(citing S.C. Res. 2178, ¶ 18 (Sept. 24, 2014)) (“identifying INTERPOL as the ‘global law enforcement
information sharing’ platform against foreign fighters”).
11. See SLTD Database, INTERPOL, http://www.interpol.int/INTERPOL-expertise/Bordermanagement/SLTD-Database [https://perma.cc/PKB9-AZBT] (“INTERPOL’s [SLTD] enables
INTERPOL National Central Bureaus (NCBs) and other authorized law enforcement entities—such as
immigration and border control officers—to ascertain the validity of a travel document (passports,
identity documents, visas) in seconds . . . . Details of stolen and lost passports are submitted directly to
the SLTD database by INTERPOL NCBs and law enforcement agencies via INTERPOL’s I-24/7
secure global police communication system.”).
12. Malaysia Airlines MH370: Stolen Passports ‘No Terror Link’, BBC (March 11, 2014),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-26525281 [https://perma.cc/H3YC-6HNM].
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370, which was scheduled to fly from Kuala Lumpur International Airport
in Malaysia to Beijing Capital International Airport in China, disappeared
on March 8, 2014. Later, officers discovered that two Iranian men were
traveling on that flight with Austrian and Italian passports stolen in
Thailand in 2012 and 2013, both of which were registered on
INTERPOL’s SLTD database. 13 Thus, if frontline officers (in this case,
immigration officers) at the border did not have access to such information
about stolen passports, which is shared through INTERPOL, the
hypothetical example given above could have been a real-life disaster.
Consider digital space, by contrast. There are no territorial and
physical borders that frontline law enforcement officers can police. The
Internet allows criminals to remotely access and create harm through
globally-integrated networks, sometimes even anonymously, regardless of
physical borders. Through internationally connected financial services,
criminals move illicitly-gained money swiftly from one jurisdiction to
another via the Internet. Similarly, when an individual uses an ISP to
upload an image located on a server in a foreign state, there is no frontline
law enforcement officer monitoring whether the image is, for example,
child pornography. The same problem applies to a hacker who sends an
email with malware to employees of critical infrastructure in a foreign
country.
To detect and deter crime in the global-digital era, states have no
choice but to increasingly rely on private sector actors who are often crime
victims or facilitators, instead of frontline law enforcement officers. In the
hypothetical above, if there were no immigration officers, then states
would have to depend on airlines, which provide the travel or financial
institutions that transfer the money used to finance crime, to detect and
report it to national authorities for further investigation and possible
indictment. However, detection and reporting of crime is only possible
and feasible if the private sector is equipped with the requisite
governmental crime information: both domestic and foreign. In the
hypothetical provided above, the frontline law enforcement was
authorized to access INTERPOL’s SLTD database. If the airline had
access to the SLTD database, it could have directly discovered the
suspicious identity of the foreign terrorists when they were booking the
flight and again when they checked in for the flight. Likewise, if
INTERPOL had shared the SLTD database with BNP Paribas, the foreign
terrorists might have been exposed to national law enforcement authorities
when they attempted to open a bank account.
13. Press Release, INTERPOL Confirms at Least Two Stolen Passports Used by Passengers on
Missing Malaysian Airlines Flight 370 Were Registered in its Databases, INTERPOL (Mar. 9, 2014),
http://www.interpol.int/News-and-media/News/2014/N2014-038 [https://perma.cc/HY6D-6CYK].
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This sort of transnational vertical cooperation is at an embryonic
stage. New top-down cooperation initiatives are showing promise, though
they currently depend on voluntary reporting of crime by private actors.
For instance, INTERPOL, following a 16-month pilot project with
AirAsia, recently endorsed the I-Checkit program. 14 I-Checkit is a border
management screening process that gives private actors such as airlines
access to its SLTD database, pursuant to a resolution adopted at
INTERPOL’s 84th General Assembly in 2015.15 Although I-Checkit is
currently the only system that allows direct access by a private sector to
crime information possessed by domestic and foreign governments, it
should be expanded further, both in scope and content. Eventually, ICheckit will be piloted in other industries, including the hotel, banking,
and maritime transportation sectors. 16
The importance of international sharing of governmental crime
information with the private sector (top-down cooperation) becomes even
more critical when states impose a regulatory obligation on the private
sector to report (bottom-up cooperation), effectively making the latter take
on the role of frontline law enforcement officers. 17 A start in that
direction is evident in the United Nations’ multilateral treaties that tackle
specific transnational crimes, including corruption, terrorism, and drugtrafficking—such conventions typically require member states to impose a
duty to report suspicious transactions on their financial institutions.18
Additionally, to combat cybercrimes, the European Union (“EU”) adopted
a directive that obligates public electronic communications service
providers to report a breach of security that leads to personal data being
lost or stolen. 19 It also requires market operators to flag incidents that
significantly impact the security of the core services they provide.20
14. The
INTERPOL
I-Checkit
Solution,
AG-2015-RES-03,
1
(2015),
https://www.interpol.int/News-and-media/Events/2015/84th-INTERPOL-General-Assembly/84thINTERPOL-General-Assembly-Resolutions [https://perma.cc/J7J5-9FP6].
15. See id.
16. Id. at 2.
17. See Interpol Stolen Passport Database Open to 2 Airlines, RT (Mar 12, 2014),
https://www.rt.com/news/interpol-stolen-passport-database-318/
[https://perma.cc/4SWB-VZFK]
(citing the statement of Tony Tyler, Director General of the International Air Transport Association)
(“It is not a job for airlines, it is a job for governments.”).
18. U.N. Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, Dec. 13, 2000, 40 I.L.M. 335
(2001) [hereinafter UNTOC]; U.N. Convention on Corruption, Dec. 9, 2003, 43 I.L.M. 37 (2004)
[hereinafter UNCAC]; U.N. Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic
Substances, Dec. 20, 1988, 28 I.L.M. 493 (1989) [hereinafter UNNDPS]; International Convention on
Financing of Terrorism, Dec. 9, 1999, 39 I.L.M. 270 (2000) [hereinafter UNICSFT].
19. Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002
Concerning the Processing of Personal Data and the Protection of Privacy in the Electronic
Communications Sector, 2002 O.J. (L 201) 37 [hereinafter E-privacy Directive], http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CONSLEG:2002L0058:20091219:EN:HTML
[https://perma.cc/67ZT-5CKT].
20. Directive 2016/1148 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 2016
Concerning Measures for a High Common Level of Security of Network and Information Systems
Across the Union, 2016 O.J. (L 194) 1 [hereinafter NIS Directive], http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
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However, these global initiatives only impose one-way, bottom-up
obligations; they do not emphasize the need for governments to share
information with the private sector to enable it to accomplish those
obligations in a global, digitized world.
II. IN DEFENSE OF THE GLOBAL REGULATION OF A “DUTY TO REPORT
CRIME” IN THE GLOBAL-DIGITAL ERA
In a previous paper, an argument was put forward in favor of making
the failure to report certain acts a crime in some domestic contexts.21
International criminal law is a different enterprise, given the scarcity of
international enforcement institutions. The International Criminal Court
(“ICC”), for instance, confines its jurisdiction to a small set of the most
serious crimes—war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide, and
aggression.
In theory, this small set should be expanded to include other serious
offenses, such as terrorism, corruption, international money laundering, or
global drug dealing, which are currently entrusted to domestic criminal
enforcement. But, consensus is lacking on the question of whether these
are international crimes requiring international enforcement.
When we explore the ramifications of a duty-to-report in the
international context, we run up against the fact that there is no serious
argument favoring an international crime of failure to report. Instead, the
international treaties impose a “duty to report crime” but do not specify
any penalty for a failure to report crime. For instance, none of the
international treaties that impose a duty to report suspicious transactions
identify the sanctions for noncompliance. These are the UN Convention
against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances
(“UNNDPS”),22 the UN International Convention for the Suppression of
the Financing of Terrorism (“UNICSFT”), 23 the UN Convention against
Transnational Organized Crime (“UNTOC”), 24 and the UN Convention
Against Corruption (“UNCAC”). 25
Additionally, the EU directives that impose a duty to report cyber
incidents or data breaches do not dictate any specific sanctions for
noncompliance. In relation to a duty to report cyber incidents, Article 21
of the Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council
Concerning Measures for a High Common Level of Security of Network
content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv:OJ.L_.2016.194.01.0001.01.ENG&toc=OJ:L:2016:194:TOC
[https://perma.cc/54VZ-THG9].
21. Kang, supra note 1.
22. UNNDPS, supra note 18.
23. UNICSFT, supra note 18.
24. UNTOC, supra note 18.
25. UNCAC, supra note 18.
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and Information Systems Across the Union (“NIS Directive”) gives
discretion to each member state while requiring the sanction to be
“effective, proportionate and dissuasive.” 26 Regarding failure to report
data breaches, Article 15a of the Amended Directive 2002/58/EC of the
European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002 Concerning the
Processing of Personal Data and the Protection of Privacy in the
Electronic Communications Sector (“E-privacy Directive”) mentions a
criminal penalty but simply as one of the possible sanctions, instead
leaving member states to decide the “effective, proportionate and
dissuasive” sanction. 27
Relevant discussion focuses on how to facilitate publicly beneficial
acts of reporting crime in the absence of the threat of criminal
enforcement. Accordingly, the question reduces to: what can we do to
ensure maximum compliance with a “duty to report” when criminal law is
not an option?
In this Part, I articulate how this may be done. In doing so, solutions
do not appear so much as “criminal law,” per se, but rather as
“administrative law,” or more properly, “global administrative law.” The
particular type of global administrative regime is perhaps best
characterized as a “transnational public-private partnership”
(“transnational mutual vertical cooperation”). This regime has certain key
features that will be illustrated throughout this Article.
A. Taxonomy of Crime
To establish a basis for further analysis, this Article categorizes the
crimes to be reported into three different classifications. This taxonomy of
crime is based on the current main modus operandi of the crime. Because
the modus operandi of a crime could be diverse or in transition by
exploiting the technological development, it is difficult to make a clear-cut
classification of a specific crime into one of three types simply by using its
legal name. Depending on the modus operandi that is targeted by a duty
to report, a crime of terrorism could be transnational-physical (e.g.
terrorist bombings) or global-digital (e.g. financing of terrorism). The
crime of sexual abuse of a child, which is currently regarded as a localphysical crime, could soon be regarded also as a transnational-physical
crime. Nevertheless, a tripartite classification is set out below and the
characteristics of each category is briefly described in each of the
following three sections.

26. NIS Directive, supra note 20, art. 21.
27. E-privacy Directive, supra note 19, art. 15(a)(1).
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1. Local-Physical Crime
Before the development of transportation and telecommunication
technologies diversified how criminal purposes could be achieved, crimes
tended to be committed physically and locally. For instance, to commit
property crimes, criminals had to physically invade someone’s property.
To commit bodily harm, criminals had to use physical force, sometimes
with weapons.
Even in this modern digitalized global era, local-physical crimes
make up a large proportion of the total crimes committed. For instance,
most crimes against children are committed physically by family
members, 28 and sexual abuse of children tends to be committed locally by
family members or by people known to the child. 29 Elder abuse is mostly
committed in domestic settings (the elder’s or caregiver’s home) or
institutional settings (such as residential facilities for the elderly). 30 In
addition, some crimes are local-physical crimes by definition. As an
example, the crime of releasing hazardous substances in the United States
is defined as a release made “into or upon the navigable waters of the
United States, adjoining shorelines, or into or upon the waters of the
contiguous zone.” 31
2. Transnational-Physical Crime
By modern transportation, some previously local-physical crimes
have transformed themselves into transnational-physical crimes.
Development of technology has increased the ease and speed of transborder movement and decreased the cost of that movement for the benefit
of all, including criminals. Terrorists of one state now move across
borders to receive military training, provide logistical support, and commit
terrorist attacks in other states. Transnational criminal organizations have
expanded in size and influence, searching for new markets to smuggle
drugs, humans, and firearms across borders.
In addition, once the development of transportation technology

28. Crimes Against Children, INTERPOL, http://www.interpol.int/Crime-areas/Crimes-againstchildren/Crimes-against-children [https://perma.cc/2MZ7-A82P].
29. The Dru Sjodin National Sex Offender Public Website, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE,
https://www.nsopw.gov/en-us/Education/FactsStatistics?AspxAutoDetectCookieSupport=1
[https://perma.cc/3VQT-4NDE] (“An estimated 60% of perpetrators of sexual abuse are known to the
child but are not family members, e.g., family friends, babysitters, child care providers, neighbors.
About 30% of perpetrators of child sexual abuse are family members.”).
30. Thomas L. Hafemeister, Financial Abuse of the Elderly in Domestic Setting, in ELDER
MISTREATMENT: ABUSE, NEGLECT, AND EXPLOITATION IN AN AGING AMERICA 382, 384 (Richard J.
Bonnie
&
Robert
B.
Wallace
eds.,
Nat’l
Academies
Press
2003)
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK98802/pdf/Bookshelf_NBK98802.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Y9GC-RYYK].
31. 42 U.S.C. § 9603(b)(1) (1996).
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further lowers the cost of criminals crossing borders over the breakeven
point, crimes which currently exist as local-physical crimes could evolve
into transnational-physical crimes. For instance, regarding the child abuse
example mentioned above, a child abuser might displace the crime to
foreign states where law is enforced poorly against child abuse.
With globalization and digitalization, these transnational-physical
crimes increasingly accompany the modus operandi of global-digital
crime, which does not require physically crossing borders. Terrorists or
organized criminals communicate with members in foreign states through
emails or phones to plan and coordinate operations. Although these acts
may constitute an inchoate crime, which could be categorized as a globaldigital crime, this Article clarifies that the distinction between a localphysical crime and a global-digital crime would only consider the main
modus operandi of the complete crime to determine its classification
within this taxonomy.
3. Global-Digital Crime
In the global-digital era, the exponential development of
telecommunication technologies has increasingly globalized and
digitalized crimes. This digitalization has globalized crimes and the harm
they cause by minimizing or removing the cost constraints incurred in
physically moving across borders.
By adopting new digitalized tactics in carrying out all or main parts
of criminal acts, former local-physical and transnational crimes are now
committed globally without physically crossing borders. For example,
though mostly a local-physical crime, child sexual abuse could be
committed without physical contact by an individual on the other side of
the world through the Internet. 32 Moreover, once an individual has
Internet access, regardless of location, they can easily sell illegal drugs
through the “deep [w]eb.” 33 Likewise, terrorist organizations are able to
finance their operations abroad by layering their transactions to hide the
ultimate destination through financial institutions in multiple
jurisdictions. 34 Corrupt officers use shell companies abroad to launder

32. See Sonia Livingstone & Leslie Haddon, EU Kids Online: Final Report, at 10 (2009),
http://www.lse.ac.uk/media@lse/research/EUKidsOnline/EU%20Kids%20I%20(20069)/EU%20Kids%20Online%20I%20Reports/EUKidsOnlineFinalReport.pdf [https://perma.cc/2ARCKPS2].
33. Steven Nelson, Buying Drugs Online Remains Easy, 2 Years After FBI Killed Silk Road, U.S.
NEWS (Oct. 2, 2015), http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2015/10/02/buying-drugs-online-remainseasy-2-years-after-fbi-killed-silk-road [https://perma.cc/4BHX-TTEH].
34. Press Release, Remarks of Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence David
Cohen Before the Center for a New American Security on “Confronting New Threats in Terrorist
Financing”, U.S. DEPT. OF TREASURY (Mar. 4, 2014), https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/pressreleases/Pages/jl2308.aspx [https://perma.cc/92JN-25JH].
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illicit funds obtained from foreign or domestic companies through the
international financial system. 35
Additionally, formerly non-existent digitalized crimes, such as cyber
child pornography, cyber security incidents, and data breaches have
emerged. These new crimes rely on the ability of data to move freely
through cable networks regardless of physical, territorial boundaries.36
Two recent high-profile examples may help illustrate the types of crime
that fall into this group. First, it was alleged that North Korea, by
deploying destructive malware, was able to destroy Sony’s systems and
steal sensitive personal and commercial data without entering U.S.
territory. 37 Second, seven Iranians were indicted for their Digital Denial
of Service (“DDoS”) attacks: attacks using a group of devices located
across the Internet and “remotely controlled by hackers without the
knowledge of the rightful owner,” 38 against nearly fifty institutions in the
U.S. financial sector, which resulted in the loss of tens of millions of
dollars. 39 Clearly, global-digital crime is a type of crime that is growing
steadily more significant for law enforcement officials and the victims of
those crimes. The following section seeks to address how we might
measure the efficiency by which law enforcement officials combat these
three categories of crimes.
B. Methods of Analysis: Efficiency
This research engages in efficiency analysis by focusing on the
characteristics of a “duty to report crime” as an administrative law.
However, the moral culpability test, which was discussed in earlier
criminal-law-focused research, is also helpful. Therefore, this Article
utilizes the analytical framework and principles derived from the moral
culpability test.
In measuring output, the crime deterrence, which I explained in my

35. Scott Shane, Panama Papers Reveal Wide Use of Shell Companies by African Officials, N.Y.
TIMES (July 25, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/25/world/americas/panama-papers-revealwide-use-of-shell-companies-by-african-officials.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/C9LD-ZMPA].
36. Dan Robel, International Cybercrime Treaty: Looking Beyond Ratification, at 25 (Aug.
15,2006), https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/incident/international-cybercrime-treatyratification-1756 [https://perma.cc/UX9U-NDDK] (“As mentioned earlier, a person behind a computer
can just as easily connect to a computer in another country across the ocean as a computer within the
same general region.”).
37. Press
Release, Update on Sony Investigation, FBI (Dec. 19, 2014),
https://www.fbi.gov/news/pressrel/press-releases/update-on-sony-investigation
[https://perma.cc/4ADS-YAV8] (last visited Nov. 30, 2016).
38. Benoit Dupont, Hacking the Panopticon: Distributed Online Surveillance and Resistance, in
SURVEILLANCE AND GOVERNANCE: CRIME CONTROL AND BEYOND 257, 268 (Eds. Mathieu Deflem &
Jeffrey T. Ulmer, 2008).
39. Iranians Charged with Hacking U.S. Financial Sector, FBI (Mar. 24, 2016),
https://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2016/march/iranians-charged-with-hacking-us-financial-sector
[https://perma.cc/E7KU-XLYY].

2018]

In Defense of the Global Regulation of a “Duty to Report Crime”

87

previous Article as a moral culpability factor of good produced by
reporting, 40 is also assessed here by a different metric. This analysis is
carried out by types of crime, based on the taxonomy set out in Section A
above, to explore the disparity in the output of a “duty to report crime”
caused by the “global” administrative regulation. To evaluate input, a
principle (i.e. the provision of governmental crime information to private
reporters) derived from the moral culpability test is studied as it
significantly affects the cost for the choke point private actors. This piece
further describes more details of the rationales.
This Article advocates for the efficiency test, recognizing that there
are generally four criteria employed by the state, prospectively or
retrospectively—effectiveness, cost-effectiveness, efficiency, and
equity—in evaluating an administrative regulation. 41 Among these, costeffectiveness and efficiency are widely accepted tools.42 While costeffectiveness aims to find the lowest-cost policy in achieving the same
output, efficiency aims to observe the regulation with the minimum
possible inputs and maximum possible outputs. 43 Since an output of the
“duty to report crime” regulations—the deterrence of crime—cannot be
assumed to be same as that required in the cost-effectiveness analysis, this
Article employs the efficiency analysis.
This Article takes a qualitative approach in measuring efficiency.
Generally, the efficiency of a regulation is evaluated in a quantitative way
by comparing the monetary value of the output with the input and
calculating the internal rate of return that equalizes the present monetary
value of the output and input. 44 This quantitative analysis needs to focus
on a specific law to measure the output and input. However, the purpose
of this Part is to provide justification for the global regulations of “duty to
report crime.” Thus, the important task of quantitative efficiency analysis
is left to future scholarship.
C. Global Regulations Effectuating the Domestic Regulations of a “Duty
to Report Crime”
This Part considers whether the domestic regulations of a “duty to
report crime” can maximize deterrence without any support from
40. Kang, supra note 1, at 377.
41.Cary Coglianese, Measuring Regulatory Performance, in THE ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-

OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT 18 (Aug. 2012), https://www.oecd.org/gov/regulatorypolicy/1_coglianese%20web.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZP9Z-HEU5].
42. Id.
43. Sourcebook for Evaluating Global and Regional Partnership Program, WORLD BANK 65
(2007),
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTGLOREGPARPROG/Resources/grpp_sourcebook_chap11.pdf
[https://perma.cc/PZ2J-2VUE ].
44. Id.
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international institutions or norms.
1. Crime Deterrence as a Policy Output
Crime deterrence as a policy output of an administrative “duty to
report crime” is the same concept of crime deterrence under criminal law;
although deterring bad acts is also part of the purpose of administrative
law.
The only distinction between those two is the independent variable in
the metric of crime deterrence. While criminal law effectuates crime
deterrence with a strong punishment, the administrative regulatory “duty
to report crime” accomplishes crime deterrence by raising the probability
of punishment. Indeed, the administrative “duty to report crime” deters
crimes with a higher crime detection rate (i.e. an increased chance of
getting caught), which is regarded by many scholars as a crucial factor in
deterring crime, sometimes even more than a stronger punishment. 45
This crime deterrence can be subdivided into specific deterrence and
general deterrence. 46 Specific deterrence is deterrence of “the individual
criminal offender from committing that crime again in the future,” while
general deterrence is deterrence of the public other than the criminal
offender from committing a crime. 47
This paper considers both specific and general deterrence without
distinction in assessing whether the output, a higher probability of
punishment, will discourage not only the general public but also the
individual offender.
Instead, the probability of punishment will
encompass general deterrence as probability of detection and specific
deterrence as probability of arrest. 48
This non-distinction contrasts with the distinction between specific
and general deterrence made in my previous Article. The rationale behind
this is to point out the different approaches adopted in justifying the “duty
to report crime” law under administrative law in this Article and under
criminal law in the previous one.
Administrative law aims to focus on “handing out benefits to large

45. Jennifer Arlen & Reinier Kraakman, Controlling Corporate Misconduct: An Analysis of
Corporate Liability Regimes, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 687, 779 n. 22 (1997) (“[I]ndividuals . . . are more
deterred by a high probability of a relatively low sanction than a low probability of a very high
sanction.”) (citing JAMES Q. WILSON & RICHARD J. HERRNSTEIN, CRIME & HUMAN NATURE 397–401
(1985)).
46. Jonathan Odo et al., Deterrence Theory, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PRISONS & CORRECTIONAL
FACILITIES 233, 234 (Bosworth ed., 2005).
47. Id.
48. Arrest achieves specific deterrence. See generally George S. Bridges & James A. Stone,
Effects of Criminal Punishment on Perceived Threat of Punishment—Toward an Understanding of
Specific Deterrence, 23 J. OF RES. IN CRIM. & DELINQ. 207 (1986); FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON
J. HAWKINS, DETERRENCE: THE LEGAL THREAT IN CRIME CONTROL (1973).
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numbers of recipients,” as appropriately illustrated by Ronald A. Cass.49
Accordingly, an administrative law could be justified when it achieves the
optimal benefit from the perspective of the general public. In this sense,
the distinction between specific and general deterrence is meaningless, as
both are beneficial to the public.
By contrast, criminal law is oriented towards focusing “on specific
conduct so outside the realm of the acceptable as to be criminal.” 50 This
specific criminal conduct is conceptualized in two ways, moralist and
instrumentalist, which affect the metric of deterrence. 51 Instrumentalists
view criminal law as “an efficient means to whatever goals the theory
posits” and accept a similar metric of crime deterrence for administrative
law by considering both specific and general deterrence as goals of
On the contrary, moralists emphasize traditional
criminal law. 52
culpability limitation from the perspective of an individual criminal
offender. 53 Accordingly, moralists do not consider after effects, including
crime deterrence, attained by using criminal punishment as a tool.
The previous piece adopts this moralist view to control overcriminalization, which is a by-product of the instrumentalist view.54 In
justifying the criminalization of a failure to report crime, it considers
specific deterrence, not as an aim to achieve, but as a factor—the good (or
reduced harm) caused by reporting—affecting one’s immorality of nonreporting. 55 On the contrary, general deterrence was not considered, as it
fails to satisfy causation: the good of general deterrence is too distant from
the individual’s act of reporting for it to be regarded as a cause of one’s
moral decision to report. 56
2. Crime Deterrence in Terms of the Taxonomy of Crime
The expected value of crime deterrence of domestic “duty to report
crime” regulations could vary without corresponding global regulations,

49. Ronald A. Cass, Overcriminalization: Administrative Regulation, Prosecutorial Discretion,
and the Rule of Law, 15 ENGAGE NO. 2 (December 16, 2014), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2520533
[https://perma.cc/T67A-27SU].
50. Id.
51. Theories of Criminal Law, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (May 14, 2013),
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/criminal-law/ [https://perma.cc/P8DL-46PS].
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Kang, supra note 1, at 362.
55. Id. at 377 (“Based on crime reporting, state authorities detect the crime reported and deter the
offender from materializing on-going or future harm through retribution or rehabilitation. In addition,
using the reported information shared through state authorities, other private entities could detect and
deter covert on-going or possible future crimes. All of these will lead to higher detection rates,
resulting in general deterrence of crime. The overall quantity of good produced depends on the
characteristics of crime: its type, magnitude, extensiveness, and continuity or repeatability of harm.”).
56. Id. (“The harm mitigated by general deterrence is too distant from the act of reporting to
qualify as the harm caused by non-reporting.”).
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depending on the types—local-physical, transnational-physical, or globaldigital—of crimes. This Section discusses crime deterrence specifically in
terms of each of these three types of crime.
i. Local-Physical Crime
Domestic regulations that establish a “duty to report” local-physical
crimes can maximize crime deterrence effect, without coordination at the
international level, by incorporating the increased detection rate to the
furthest extent.
In relation to a probability of crime detection, domestic regulation of
a “duty to report crime” would effectively deter potential offenders from
committing the local-physical crime, as it is neither easy nor feasible for
the crime to be displaced to foreign jurisdictions where such duties are
absent. Criminal acts and harm caused by the local-physical crime tend to
stay in the local jurisdiction of said domestic regulation and will be
witnessed and reported by the required domestic choke point private
actors. Simply put, awareness of the higher risk of getting caught will
deter the potential offender from committing the crime.
For instance, crimes involving the sexual abuse of children are
usually prosecuted locally; it would be difficult to remove them to foreign
jurisdictions with lower detection rates (i.e. jurisdictions without a duty to
report). Under U.S. federal law, school teachers, physicians, psychiatrists,
and many other professionals are required to report suspected child abuse
to the designated national authorities as soon as possible. 57 Although the
designated professions and the definition of child abuse can vary by state,
most states in the United States (forty-eight) have imposed a duty to report
child abuse on certain professions. 58 Two other states require all persons
to report child abuse.59 Thus, there will generally be a higher detection
rate of child abuse in the United States compared to other jurisdictions that
do not have such a duty. Practically, it would be difficult for a parent in
the United States who would commit child abuse, which is a localphysical crime, to evade higher domestic detection by moving to a foreign
state without a duty to report child abuse or sending his or her child to a
school or to a physician in the foreign state.
In addition, domestic regulations of the duty to report local-physical
crimes fulfill their expected crime deterrence role because the effect of an
increased crime detection rate, led by crime reporting, is less likely to be

57. 34 U.S.C. § 20341 (2017).
58. See generally Mandatory Reporters of Child Abuse and Neglect, CHILDREN’S BUREAU OF

U.S.
DEPT.
OF
HEALTH
&
HUMAN
SERVICES,
at
https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubPDFs/manda.pdf [https://perma.cc/BZ6Q-66F3].
59. Id.

2

(2016),
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diminished by the barriers of sovereignty. Reports of local-physical crime
are made to the state authorities who have jurisdiction over the reported
crime. The information and evidence about the crime and the harm caused
by the crime remain within its jurisdiction. The state authorities have
legal authority to access the necessary information and evidence located in
their jurisdiction and to take necessary measures to minimize or eliminate
the imminent harm.
For example, the harm caused by the crime of releasing hazardous
substances is local to the navigable waters of the United States, which is
the statutory subject of protection. To prevent the expansion of the harm
caused by the toxic substance and to incapacitate and deter the offender,
the U.S. authorities, without any permission or assistance from foreign
states, can investigate and take necessary measures.
The foregoing analysis makes it clear that domestic regulations that
create a duty to report local-physical crimes can attain their maximum
output without such a duty being embraced at the global level. This may
explain the absence of current international and regional legal instruments
that require choke point private actors to report local-physical crimes.
At the international level, the United Nations adopted the Convention
on the Rights of the Child in 1989 (“CRC”) to provide special safeguards
and care needed for the child by reason of his or her physical and mental
immaturity. 60 Concerned with the increasing risk of sexual exploitation of
children, in 2000 the United Nations subsequently drafted the Optional
Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Sale of
Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography (“U.N. Optional
Protocol”). 61 However, neither the CRC nor the Optional Protocol
mandates that state parties must adopt a regulation on the duty to report
child abuse. 62
At the regional level, in 2007, the Council of Europe adopted the
Convention on the Protection of Children Against Sexual Exploitation and
Sexual Abuse (“CoE Convention on the Protection of Children”).63
Although Article 12 of this Convention requires member states to
encourage voluntary reporting of suspicious sexual exploitation or sexual
abuse by ensuring exemption of liability from possible breach of
confidentiality, it does not require any mandatory reporting. 64
60. The Convention on the Rights of the Child, Pmbl. Nov. 20, 1989, 28 ILM 1456 (1989).
61. G.A. Res. 54/263, annex II, Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child

on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography, U.N. Doc. A/54/49 (Jan. 18, 2002).
62. Id. art. 9. (“States Parties shall take appropriate measures aimed at effectively prohibiting
the production and dissemination of material advertising the offences described in the present
Protocol.”) (emphasis added).
63. Council of Europe, Convention on the Protection of Children against Sexual Exploitation and
Sexual Abuse, art 12(2), CETS No. 201 (2007).
64. Id. art. 12(1)–(2).
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Although international laws on child abuse do not currently provide
for mandatory reporting, these policies may not continue indefinitely. The
CoE Convention on the Protection of Children identifies several choke
point private actors—the information and communication technology
sectors, the tourism and travel industry, and the banking and finance
sectors—which are crucial for preventing sexual exploitation and the
abuse of children. 65 As the modus operandi of child abuse increasingly
involves advanced means of transportation and telecommunication
technologies, a duty to report child abuse needs to be imposed at the
global level on the identified choke point private actors.
ii. Transnational-Physical Crime
To achieve the expected crime deterrence outcome, regulation of the
duty to report transnational-physical crime and enhanced cooperation
between states should be embraced by international law. Unlike a localphysical crime, a transnational-physical crime is easily displaced to a
foreign state without a “duty to report crime” to evade the higher domestic
detection rate, thus lowering the probability of crime detection. If the cost
of movement decreases further, it is plausible that a parent living in the
United States might simply take his or her abused child to a physician in a
foreign state where physicians are under no obligation to report child
abuse. Even the lowered detection rate caused by crime displacement
might not be fully transformed into an arrest due to barriers of
sovereignty. The arrest will be conditioned on effective cooperation with
the foreign states involved.
In terms of the modus operandi of drug trafficking, which mainly
involves physically crossing borders, the UNNDPS requires
“manufacturers, importers, exporters, wholesalers and retailers [to] inform
the competent authorities of suspicious orders and transactions,” 66 and “a
commercial carrier operating within the territory of the Party . . . [to
report] to the appropriate authorities at the earliest opportunity all
suspicious circumstances.” 67 In order to transform detected crimes to
arrests by strengthening cooperation between states, the UNNDPS calls
for efficient use of INTERPOL. 68 The Convention also includes the basis
of traditional cooperation: confiscation, 69 extradition, 70 mutual legal
assistance, 71 and transfer of proceedings. 72 It further requires member
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Id. art. 9(2).
UNNDPS, supra note 18, art. 12(9)(a).
Id. art 15(2)(b)(iii).
Id. art. 1.
Id. art. 5.
Id. art. 6.
Id. art. 7.
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states to adopt other forms of cooperation to enhance the effectiveness of
investigation by:
Establish[ing] and maintain[ing] channels of communication between
their competent agencies and services to facilitate the secure and rapid
exchange of information” and “[c]o-operat[ing] with one another in
conducting enquiries . . . concerning: (i) The identity, whereabouts and
activities of persons suspected of being involved . . . ; (ii) The
movement of proceeds or property derived from the commission of such
offences; (iii) The movement of narcotic drugs. 73

Despite these provisions concerning drug trafficking, there is a lack
of global regulations requiring a duty to report other transnational-physical
crimes that result in similar, or even greater, harm. For instance, unlike
the private sector actors who are exploited by drug traffickers and who are
required to report suspicious transactions, the private sector actors who are
abused or sometimes targeted by terrorist attacks (other than financial
institutions abused for the financing of terrorism, which will be dealt with
as a global-digital crime) 74 are not under an obligation to report suspicious
activities. None of the nineteen international conventions adopted to
suppress different types of terrorism require such a duty to report
suspicions of terrorist attacks. 75 Reverting to the hypothetical in the
introduction, the airline would not have to report any suspicion of
terrorism even if it were furnished with proper crime information through
the SLTD database.
Instead, even in the absence of global regulations creating a “duty to
report crime,” transnational-physical crimes are exposed to higher
detection by public authorities at the border. This somewhat complements
lower detection by the private sector than local-physical crimes. Because
transnational-physical crimes must physically cross the border, the
criminals will go through inspections by border control authorities. As in
the hypothetical example where the immigration officers could disrupt the
terrorists’ plot thanks to a positive match with INTERPOL’s SLTD
database, frontline public authorities at the border, supported by
appropriate information-sharing and cooperation between states, add risk
of detection to transnational-physical crimes.
iii. Global-Digital Crime
Regarding global-digital crimes, the domestic “duty to report crime”
regulations, by themselves, without close coordination at the global level,
would fail to maximize crime deterrence due to the same rationale—a
72.
73.
74.
75.

UNNDPS, supra note 18, art. 8.
Id. art. 9(1)(b).
See infra Part II.C.2.c.
See, e.g., UNNDPS, supra note 18.
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lower probability of crime detection caused by crime displacement and a
lower probability of arrest prompted by barriers of sovereignty—which
will mean they fail to deter transnational-physical crime. 76 Criminals in
this global-digital era easily “leverage technology to conduct operations at
a greater distance . . . which provide both physical and legal protection for
offenders . . . while complicating governmental efforts to detect,
investigate and disrupt transnational crimes and illicit activities.” 77
For instance, under 31 U.S.C. § 5318, financial institutions in the
United States are required to report suspicious transactions 78 and to
practice what is referred to as “Enhanced Due Diligence” for certain risky
transactions, 79 including transactions involving foreign “Politically
Exposed Persons” (“PEPs”). To avoid the high risk of detection in using
U.S. financial institutions, corrupt foreign officers may open an account in
the name of a shell company with a financial institution in a third
jurisdiction that has no, or a less strict, “duty to report crime” provision.
Bribers in the United States will use such financial institutions to launder
illicit funds to be transferred to the corrupted officer, thereby easily
lowering the risk of detection. Knowing this, potential offenders would
not be deterred from committing global-digital crime.
In addition, the barriers of sovereignty, exemplified by the many
provisos mentioned below, hinder the crime detection-to-arrest process.
Even when a financial institution in a third jurisdiction can detect the
suspicious transaction of unlawful funds, it will report to its own state
agency. The foreign state authorities with the reported information will
communicate the information, if they wish, to U.S. authorities who have
jurisdiction over the corruption following their own domestic mutual legal
assistance law or treaties between the two states. While proceeding with
the investigation, foreign authorities may or may not assist in obtaining
evidence and information located in their jurisdiction, as requested by U.S.
authorities. All these processes provide legal and physical protection to
the criminal and lower the possibility of apprehension of suspects.
Enactment of a global regulation establishing a “duty to report crime”
is particularly essential for the deterrence of global-digital crimes, more so
than for transnational-physical crimes.
Although deterrence of
transnational-physical crimes diminishes due to crime displacement and
sovereignty barriers, this lowered deterrence is somewhat compensated for

76. This problem of crime displacement is properly described as a “third-country problem” in
relation to tax evasion, where money freely trespasses national boundaries through international
financial networks. See Michael Keen & Jenny E. Ligthart, Information Sharing and International
Taxation, 13 INT. TAX & PUB. FIN. 81, 89–91 (2006).
77. Joseph Schafer, International Police Cooperation, in CRIMINOLOGY (2014).
78. 31 U.S.C. § 5318(g)(1) (2014).
79. Id. § 5318(i)(2)(B) (2014).
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by the additional public detection by frontline law enforcement officers at
the border. However, global-digital crimes have no such borders to
physically cross, thus no frontline law enforcement authorities exist, other
than the choke point private actors providing the digitalized services that
the criminals exploit. For example, unlike the attempted terrorist attack
alluded to in our hypothetical, which is a transnational-physical crime
detected by the frontline officers at the border, the financing of terrorism
is carried out through the global web of digitalized financial
transactions—it has no equivalent border controlled by frontline officers.
Thus, the role of choke point private actors, the financial institutions in the
example, is extremely important in deterring crimes in this global-digital
era.
In sum, without global regulation requiring choke point private actors
to report global-digital crimes, even states that have enacted domestic
regulations creating a duty to report global-digital crime ultimately will
suffer from a lower crime deterrence mechanism. Thus, international
society has adopted regulations on “duty to report crimes” with globaldigitalized modus operandi, most of which involve abusing Internet or
financial services for criminal purposes.
3. Lack of Global Regulation of a “Duty to Report Crime” in the GlobalDigital Era
With regards to crimes that exploit global-digitalized financial
services, most of which are financing or laundering the proceeds of crime,
the UNICSFT requires that:
[F]inancial institutions and other professions involved in financial
transactions [utilize] the most efficient measures available for the
identification of their usual or occasional customers, as well as
customers in whose interest accounts are opened, and to pay special
attention to unusual or suspicious transactions and report transactions
suspected of stemming from a criminal activity. 80

In addition, the UNTOC 81 and UNCAC 82 also impose similar duties
on financial institutions.
In contrast, regarding crimes that exploit global-digitalized Internet
services, international society has been slow to reach a consensus, while
domestic laws have established a duty to report such crimes. 83 However,
as Professor Harold Hongju Koh states, “[c]yberspace is not a ‘law-free’
80.
81.
82.
83.

UNICSFT, supra note 18, art. 18(1)(b).
Id. art 7(1)(a).
Id. art. 14(1)(a).
For instance, the United States adopted a duty to report cyber incidents by Department of
Defense contractors. See 32 C.F.R. § 236 (2016). In addition, a duty to report security breaches has
been imposed at the federal level on the health insurance industry and at the local level on general
businesses. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-5 (2012); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 75-65 (West 2009).
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zone where anyone can conduct hostile activities without rules or
restraint,” but instead international society needs to “articulate and build
consensus around how [the existing rule] applies and reassess from there
whether and what additional understandings are needed.” 84
Only regional agreements, which regulate cyberspace, include a duty
to report cyber security incidents and data breaches. While the
Convention on Cybercrime adopted by the Council of Europe in 2001
focuses on criminal policy coordination for cybercrime investigation, 85 the
following two EU Directives aim to manage security risks of network86
and personal data 87 by improving the preparedness of member states,
including mandatory reporting by certain private service providers of
cyber incidents or data breaches to the national competent authorities.
First, the E-privacy Directive was adopted and entered into in 2002, and
amended in 2006 and 2009. 88 The amended E-privacy Directive requires
“the provider of publicly available electronic communications services
[to], without undue delay, notify the personal data breach to the competent
national authority.” 89 Second, the NIS Directive was adopted and entered
into in 2016. 90 It requires “Member States [to] ensure that operators of
essential services notify, without undue delay, the competent authority or
the CSIRT of incidents having a significant impact on the continuity of the
essential services they provide.” 91
Regarding online child pornography, legal instruments at both the
international and regional level fail to impose a mandatory reporting duty
on the private sector, while acknowledging the role of the Internet and
developing technologies in increasing accessibility to child pornography.
The UN Optional Protocol emphasizes in its preamble, “the importance of
closer cooperation and partnership between Governments and the Internet
Industry.” 92 However, other than in the preamble, the Optional Protocol
does not mention the role of the private sector nor does it provide any
specific measures, including mandatory reporting of child pornography, to
be taken by the state parties. 93
At the regional level, the CoE Convention on the Protection of

84. Harold Hongju Koh, International Law in Cyberspace, 54 HARVARD INT’L L.J. ONLINE 1, 3
(2012).
85. Convention on Cybercrime, 23.XI.2001, ETS 185, Pmbl. (“Convinced of the need to pursue,
as a matter of priority, a common criminal policy aimed at the protection of society against
cybercrime, inter alia, by adopting appropriate legislation and fostering international co-operation.”).
86. NIS Directive, supra note 20.
87. E-Privacy Directive, supra note 19.
88. Id.
89. Id. art. 4.
90. See generally NIS Directive, supra note 20.
91. Id. art. 14.
92. Optional Protocol, supra note 61, at pmbl.
93. Id. art. 9.
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Children, in tackling the issue of child pornography as one of the means
for the sexual exploitation of children, 94 recognizes information and
communication technologies as an important contributing factor to the
rapid growth in sexual exploitation and abuse of children. 95 In a number
of provisions, the CoE Convention on the Protection of Children
emphasizes and encourages the participation of the private sector 96 and
cooperation between competent state authorities and the private sector.97
However, the Convention fails to mandate reporting. 98
Additionally, in 2011, the EU adopted the Directive on Combating
Sexual Abuse and Sexual Exploitation of Children and Child Pornography
(“Directive on Sexual Abuse of Children”). The Directive updates the
CoE Convention on the Protection of Children but still does not impose a
mandatory duty to report. In relation to reporting suspected child
pornography, it simply requires member states to “take appropriate action
for setting up information services to provide information on how to
recognize the signs of sexual abuse and sexual exploitation,”99 and to
promote a hotline reporting system. 100
Overall, the necessity and importance of a global obligation and a
mandatory “duty to report crime” have been recognized by the
international society, but such regulation is still lacking for many globaldigital crimes. Thus, Section D argues that, for the currently existing and
forthcoming global regulations concerning a “duty to report crime” to be
more efficient, it is timely to perceive a vital component of the regulation.
D. Global Regulation of a (Bottom-Up) “Duty to Report Crime”
Incorporating (Top-Down) Vertical Cooperation
1. Top-Down Vertical Cooperation and Policy Input
Global regulation of a “duty to report crime” to deter global-digital

94. Council of Europe, supra note 63, art. 3(b) (“‘[S]exual exploitation and sexual abuse of
children’ shall include the behaviour as referred to in Articles 18 to 23 of this Convention.”); id. art. 20
(describing offences concerning child pornography).
95. Id. at pmbl. (“Observing that the sexual exploitation and sexual abuse of children have grown
to worrying proportions at both national and international level, in particular as regards the increased
use by both children and perpetrators of information and communication technologies (ICTs), and that
preventing and combating such sexual exploitation and sexual abuse of children require international
co-operation.”).
96. Id. art. 9(2), art. 12.
97. Id. art. 10(3) (“Each Party shall encourage co-operation between the competent state
authorities, civil society and the private sector, in order to better prevent and combat sexual
exploitation and sexual abuse of children.”).
98. Id. art. 12(2).
99. Directive 2011/93, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on
Combating the Sexual Abuse and Sexual Exploitation of Children and Child Pornography, and
Replacing Council Framework Decision 2004/68/JHA, ¶ 45, 2011 O.J. (L 335)1 (EU).
100. Id. ¶ 35.
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crime should incorporate the provision of governmental 101 crime
information to choke point private actors (i.e. top-down cooperation).
Top-down cooperation is crucial to minimizing the policy input, namely
the cost.
Above all, top-down cooperation reduces the cost of enforcement
born by the government while securing higher compliance. Top-down
cooperation was originally suggested in the previous Article in relation to
a required principle to justify criminalization of a failure to report
crime. 102 The argument is that criminal penalties should be employed
only for the most morally culpable behaviors; the principles suggested in
the previous Article, including top-down cooperation, create the contexts
whereby the choke point private actors are the most strongly morally
obliged to report crime. 103 When the law is enforcing widely-accepted
moral norms, the cost of enforcement to make the obligors comply with
the law is reduced. 104
The unnecessary burden on the private sector 105 to comply with the
duty to report will be eliminated by top-down cooperation, since it will
“lower the level of harm to a reporter by cutting the information collecting
cost and harm to the individual being reported by decreasing the
possibility of erroneous reporting.” 106 The previous research illustrated
this with an example concerning PEPs, which referred to the information
possessed by the government but kept from financial institutions in need
of the information to comply with their duty to report.107 That Article
demonstrated the lack of sharing PEPs’ information caused
“unnecessary[ily] huge costs and greater dissipation of resources for
overall [domestic] society due to a duplication of cost and efforts.”108
Considering that this Article deals with global regulation of a “duty to
report crime,” the unnecessary burden on the global private sector that
could be eliminated by sharing governmental information with choke

101. The governmental crime information is possessed by the government and includes both the
information the government itself collects and stores in its database and the information reported by
choke point private actors, or the public to the government.
102. Kang, supra note 1, at 393.
103. Id. at 374–78.
104. Id. at 371–72 (“The importance of enforcement differs depending on the way the law affects
behavior. For instance, to be an effective law, a prohibition on murder, which enforces a widely
accepted moral code, does not require as much enforcement as a prohibition on smoking marijuana,
which, depending on the individual, manipulates or expresses certain moral codes.”) (citations
omitted).
105. MARTÍN MOLINUEVO & SEBASTIÁN SÁEZ, REGULATORY ASSESSMENT TOOLKIT: A
PRACTICAL METHODOLOGY FOR ASSESSING REGULATION ON TRADE AND INVESTMENTS IN SERVICES
21 (The World Bank 2014) (“Efficiency considerations can also play a role in regulation for
noneconomic goals. An efficient regulation seeks to achieve public interest goals and avoid
introducing unnecessary burdens in the market.”).
106. Kang, supra note 1, at 392.
107. Id. at 394.
108. Id. at 395.
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point private actors is enormous.
To secure efficiency by minimizing policy input, global regulation of
a “duty to report crime” should employ this critical component of
providing governmental information to choke point private actors (i.e. topdown cooperation). Further, because the government requires the choke
point private actors to take a frontline law enforcement role (which is
originally the responsibility of the government), there is a counter-duty on
the government to minimize the burden of the choke point private actors in
carrying out such a role.
The principle of sharing governmental crime information with choke
point private actors should be respected regardless of the position of the
reporter to the crime. Although this principle was discussed regarding a
third-party reporter who has intrinsically limited information about the
crime, even an offender reporter and a victim reporter, who tend to be in a
better position regarding information about the crime, could also fail to
recognize the crime committed. 109
2. Lack of Top-Down Vertical Cooperation in Contemporary Global
“Duty to Report Crime” Regulations
To deter some transnational-physical crimes and global-digital
crimes, international and regional frameworks have been adopted that
establish a “duty to report crime.” However, no international or regional
regulations that stipulate a “duty to report crime” (i.e. bottom-up
cooperation) incorporate this vital component, namely, providing
governmental information to choke point private actors (i.e. top-down
cooperation) in their provisions, as illustrated below.
None of the international agreements discussed above (the UNNDPS,
UNICSFT, UNTOC, nor the UNCAC) require governmental crime
information to be provided to choke point private actors. With regards to
the regulation of a “duty to report crime” at the regional level, the EU NIS
Directive allows member states, after consulting the reporter, to inform the
public about cyber incidents. 110 However, sharing crime information with
the public, although helpful for choke point private actors as a source of

109. See id. at 378–79 (“A person with superior responsibility might fail to recognize the crime
committed by its employee bribing foreign officials to increase sales, as the employee will try to hide
his wrongdoings by breaching the internal compliance regulations of his employer. A victim could
fail to recognize data breaches or cyber incidents, as hackers tend to hide their attacks on victim’s
system to maximize harm.”); see also TERRENCE K. KELLY & JEFFREY HUNKER, Cyber Policy:
Institutional Struggle in a Transformed World, in CYBERSECURITY: SHARED RISKS, SHARED
RESPONSIBILITIES 3, 25 (Peter M. Shane & Jeffrey Hunker eds., 2013) (“The logic underlying publicprivate partnerships includes the government’s assumption that infrastructure owners will ‘do the right
things’ . . . . However, in the face of uncertain threats, there is no common understanding of what the
right thing is.”).
110. NIS Directive, supra note 20, art. 14(6).
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crime information to be used, is different from sharing with choke point
private actors, as will be illustrated in the later part of this paper.111 The
E-privacy Directive establishes no such measure to share governmental
crime information with choke point private actors.
III. A LEGISLATIVE BLUEPRINT FOR THE GLOBAL REGULATION OF A
“DUTY TO REPORT CRIME”
This Part answers how the legislative efforts at the international level
should manage demanded mutual vertical cooperation, particularly with
the current lack of top-down cooperation. Specifically, it considers how to
channel the requisite domestic governmental crime information to foreign
choke point private actors. Drafting a legislative blueprint is crucial for
making proper modifications to existing global regulations of a “duty to
report crime” and for enacting new regulations that are lacking in relation
to several global-digital crimes.
This Part proposes an ideal regime, an international, instantaneous
sharing regime, for top-down cooperation. However, there are three
caveats for the ideal regime to be justified as feasible and legitimate:
horizontal accountability; vertical accountability; and proportionality to
privacy/reputational harm to the subject of the shared information.112
Rationales that consider theories of international relations, global
administrative law theory, and privacy rights are offered for each caveat.
These rationales will be followed by the suggestion of a practical model to
actualize the ideal regime based on the analysis of possibilities and
limitations of contemporary architecture of international governmental
crime information sharing with choke point private actors.
A. The Ideal Regime for Top-Down Vertical Cooperation: International,
Instantaneous Sharing
In order to obtain optimal efficiency of “duty to report crime” laws in
the modern era, the principle of providing governmental crime information
to choke point private actors (i.e. top-down cooperation), derived from the
analysis on domestic laws in the previous Article, should be extended to
corresponding international laws. This means the global regulation of a
“duty to report crime” should require states to provide their governmental
information to their domestic choke point private actors; but it is not
limited to that obligation. The proposal also includes an obligation that
111. See infra Part III.B.2.iii.
112. See Kang, supra note 9, at 19. (“[T]he global AML/PEP regulatory body, whether it is the

UN or the FATF, should respect three essential values: accountability of States providing the list to
foreign States/financial institutions, accountability to the listed domestic PEPs and protection of the
PEPs’ privacy.”).
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states should supply their governmental crime information to foreign
choke point private actors. In other words, the ideal top-down cooperation
should be international, not solely domestic.
Enactment of global regulations establishing a “duty to report crime”
will fail to achieve optimal efficiency when the choke point private actors
are not supplied with the required foreign crime information. Ensuring the
absence of legal-loophole states across the globe should be supported by
the absence of information-loophole choke point private actors across the
globe. This is particularly crucial where the choke point private actors are
in the frontline in relation to deterring crimes that are easily and
instantaneously displaced from one jurisdiction to another: global-digital
crimes.
A specific example helps illustrate the point. Even if financial
institutions in all jurisdictions are required to report suspicious
transactions related to corruption and are legally authorized to access the
list of domestic PEPs possessed by their governments, the expected policy
output (corruption detection) would impact only corrupt domestic officers
using domestic financial institutions. Without access to the list of foreign
PEPs possessed by foreign governments, the financial institutions could
easily be abused by corrupt foreign officers. In other words, to evade the
risk of higher detection, corrupt domestic officers need only utilize foreign
financial institutions that lack information about their status as PEPs.
Alternatively, when financial institutions are required to gather foreign
PEP information on their own, the policy input of information gathering
cost would be enormous.
Further, the ideal regime should not just be international, but also
instantaneous. Domestic choke point private actors can access crime
information possessed by foreign governments through various
channels. 113 However, unless there is a robust instantaneous reach to the
information, the policy output will be limited. Lengthy, complicated
channels will provide criminals with opportunities to abuse informationloopholes until the choke point private actors are finally able to access the
requisite information.
A few examples help illustrate the effects of non-instantaneous
availability of information. The lapse of time provides criminals with
opportunities to layer their illicit proceeds through multiple financial
transactions, thus lowering the risk of crime detection. 114 The longer
dwell time allows hackers to materialize and aggravate the harm of cyber
incidents and data breaches, thus producing more victims, while
113. See infra Chart I.
114. See PETER REUTER & EDWIN M. TRUMAN, CHASING DIRTY MONEY: THE FIGHT AGAINST

MONEY LAUNDERING 30 (Inst. for Int’l Econ. 2004).
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eradicating evidence of the crime at the victim’s network. 115 Child
pornography will spread rapidly and widely over time throughout the
Internet; this will have a devastating effect on the abused children and a
corrosive effect on viewers.116
Lastly, to attain an instantaneous and international ideal regime, the
communication channel between states and choke point private actors
should be characterized by proactive information sharing rather than
reactive information exchange. 117
Under the information exchange, choke point private actors
encounter obstructions to instantaneous access to foreign governmental
crime information. To request information, choke point private actors
should first investigate and verify the destination of the request, then wait
for the response. Most importantly, reactive information exchange, based
on the assumption of a “need to know” threshold before it is shared,118
fails to assist choke point private actors to detect crimes where no
suspicions have been raised to trigger a request for crime information.
When they fail to recognize the hidden crime committed or when they
wrongly believe that what they witness is not a crime, information
exchange will be of no help.
In contrast, sharing information requires states, even without a
request for information from choke point private actors, to proactively
establish and continuously update databases that are promptly accessible
by the authorized choke point private actors. This assists choke point
private actors to detect and deter crime that is not initially recognized as
crime. For example, for cyber criminals, who usually hide their intrusion
into a victim’s network for a long dwell time, shared information such as
IP addresses or file names would allow the victim to locate the hidden
attack, thus minimizing the harm. Furthermore, an ISP that encounters
ambiguous child pornography could detect and confirm the crime utilizing
the shared information of hash values or a list of URLs of child
pornography.
115. ARBOR NETWORKS, New Ponemon Institute Survey Revelations on Timing (May 19, 2015),
https://www.arbornetworks.com/new-ponemon-institute-survey-reveals-time-to-identify-advancedthreats-is-98-days-for-financial-services-firms-197-days-for-retail [https://perma.cc/NYD8-SS5Q].
116. See generally CENTER FOR PROBLEM-ORIENTED POLICING, Effects of Child Pornography,
http://www.popcenter.org/problems/child_pornography/2 [https://perma.cc/572W-QMYB].
117. INTERPOL, Effective Information Sharing Underpins Efforts Against Nuclear Terrorism—
INTERPOL Chief (April 1, 2016), http://www.interpol.int/News-and-media/News/2016/N2016-041/
[https://perma.cc/B4HR-H54M] (“Targeting criminals and terrorists, and curbing their potential to
pursue their goal requires proactive, systematic sharing of and access to information as a key part of
our collective security mandate.”).
118. NAT’L COMM’N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S., The 9/11 Commission Report, at
417 (2004), https://9-11commission.gov/report/911Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/PWL4-R9XC] (“In
the 9/11 story, for example, we sometimes see examples of information that could be accessed—like
the undistributed NSA information that would have helped identify Nawaf al Hazmi in January 2000.
But someone had to ask for it. In that case, no one did.”).
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Accordingly, to optimally achieve their purpose of crime deterrence,
global regulations creating a “duty to report crime” should mandate states
to take appropriate and effective measures to instantaneously share crime
information with choke point private actors, including foreign ones. This
ideal regime may not be possible, but it is helpful to think in these terms to
understand what the goal should be. To actualize the ideal regime, the
following Section suggests how global regulation of a “duty to report
crime” should be shaped by studying the possibilities and limitations of
the contemporary architecture of international top-down cooperation.
B. Possibilities and Limitations of the Contemporary Architecture of
International Top-Down Vertical Cooperation
1. Contemporary Architecture of International Top-Down Vertical
Cooperation
This part examines the contemporary architecture of international
top-down cooperation. It draws a comprehensive map of current crime
information flow 119 between various actors at the international level—
public, private entity, government, and international organizations
(“IOs”)—which have not been fully explored in other academic works.
Post-9/11 scholarship has focused on information sharing to deter
crime, particularly terrorist attacks, with most studies limiting themselves
to the domestic level. 120 There have also been individual case studies of
119. This will only include systemized information sharing with certain sets of procedure with
designated authority. Accordingly, random information sharing will not be studied. In addition, only
proactive information sharing systems will be analyzed, as reactive information exchange does not
satisfy the instantaneous sharing components of an ideal regime.
120. Scholars on domestic information sharing have studied cooperation between different
domestic actors, emphasizing information sharing between federal agencies, particularly intelligence
and law enforcement agencies. See Craig S. Lerner, The USA PATRIOT Act: Promoting the
Cooperation of Foreign Intelligence Gathering and Law Enforcement, 11 GEO. MASON L. REV. 493,
524–26 (2003); RICHARD A. POSNER, PREVENTING SURPRISE ATTACKS: INTELLIGENCE REFORM IN
THE WAKE OF 9/11 at 26 (2005); see generally Richard Henry Seamon & William Dylan Gardner, The
PATRIOT Act and the Wall Between Foreign Intelligence and Law Enforcement, 28 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 319 (2005); Nathan Sales, Share and Share Alike: Intelligence Agencies, Information
Sharing, and National Security, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 279 (2010); Nathan Sales, Mending Walls:
Information Sharing After the USA PATRIOT Act, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1795 (2010); Danielle Keats
Citron & Frank Pasquale, Network Accountability for the Domestic Intelligence Apparatus, 62
HASTINGS L.J. 1441. Also, information sharing between federal agencies and local enforcement
authorities is another common field of study. See, e.g, DAVID L. CARTER, LAW ENFORCEMENT
INTELLIGENCE: A GUIDE FOR STATE, LOCAL, AND TRIBAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES (2004);
Matthew C. Waxman, Police and National Security: American Local Law Enforcement and
Counterterrorism After 9/11, 3 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 377 (2009); Samuel J. Rascoff, The
Law of Homegrown (Counter) Terrorism, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1715, 1726 (2010); Jason B. Jones, Note,
The Necessity of Federal Intelligence Sharing with Sub-Federal Agencies, 16 TEX. REV. L. & POL.
175, 199 (2011); Lindsey Garber, Have We Learned A Lesson? The Boston Marathon Bombings and
Information Sharing, 67 ADMIN. L. REV. 221 (2015). In addition, though mostly limited to certain
national critical infrastructures or cyber aspects of terrorism, several researches have analyzed publicprivate information sharing. See, e.g., MARKLE FOUND., CREATING A TRUSTED INFORMATION
NETWORK FOR HOMELAND SECURITY: SECOND REPORT OF THE MARKLE FOUNDATION TASK FORCE
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international information sharing or exchange regimes in criminal matters,
such as Europol, 121 INTERPOL, 122 or Mutual Legal Assistance
Even research that compares different regimes of
Treaties. 123
international crime information sharing tends to focus solely on state-tostate horizontal sharing. 124 This Article contributes to the scholarship by
drawing together generalizations from across these studies to offer a
coherent and comprehensive architecture for such transnational crime
information-sharing regimes, as indicated in Chart I below and the
explanatory notes that follow it. 125
(2003); Kristen Elizabeth Uhl, The Freedom of Information Act Post-9/11: Balancing the Public’s
Right to Know, Critical Infrastructure Protection, and Homeland Security, 53 AM. U. L. REV. 261
(2003); D. Richard Rasmussen, Is International Travel Per Se Suspicion of Terrorism? The Dispute
Between the United States and European Union over Passenger Name Record Data Transfers, 26 WIS.
INT’L L.J. 551 (2008); Elaine M. Sedenberg & Deirdre K. Mulligan, Public Health as a Model for
Cybersecurity Information Sharing, 30 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1687 (2015); John P. Carlin, Detect,
Disrupt, Deter: A Whole-of-Government Approach to National Security Cyber Threats,7 HARV.
NAT’L SEC. J. 391 (2016).
121. See Julia Ballaschk, In the Unseen Realm: Transnational Intelligence Sharing in the
European Union—Challenges to Fundamental Rights and Democratic Legitimacy, 51 STAN. J. INT’L
L. 19 (2015); Frank Cali, Europol’s Data Protection Mechanisms: What Do They Know and Whom
Are They Telling?, 10 TOURO INT’L L. REV. 189 (2000); Jacqueline Klosek, The Development of
International Police Cooperation Within the EU and Between the EU and Third Party States: A
Discussion of the Legal Bases of Such Cooperation and the Problems and Promises Resulting Thereof,
14 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 599 (1999); Francis R. Monaco, Comment, Europol: The Culmination of the
European Union’s International Police Cooperation Efforts, 19 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 247 (1995).
122. See Nina Marino & Reed Granthama, Wanted by Interpol: Strategic Thinking About Red
Notices, Diffusions, and Extradition, 30 CRIM. JUST. 4 (2015); Mario Savino, Global Administrative
Law Meets ‘Soft’ Powers: The Uncomfortable Case of Interpol Red Notices, 43 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. &
POL. 263 (2011); Peter M. Thomson, Interpol’s Transnational Policing by “Red Notice” and
“Diffusions”: Procedural Standards, Systemic Abuses, and Reforms Necessary to Assure Fairness and
Integrity, 16 ENGAGE: J. FEDERALIST SOC’Y PRAC. GROUPS 23 (2015); Corey Winer, Smoke ‘Em Out:
U.S. Counterterrorist Mishaps Necessitating the Expansion of Interpol’s Capabilities to Meet the New
Terrorist Threat, 33 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 145 (2010); Jacques Semmelman & Emily
Spencer Munson, Interpol Red Notices and Diffusions: Powerful—And Dangerous—Tools of Global
Law Enforcement, CHAMPION, May 2014, at 28.
123. See Robert Neale Lyman, Compulsory Process in a Globalized Era: Defendant Access to
Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties, 47 VA. J. INT’L L. 261 (2006); L. Song Richardson, Convicting the
Innocent in Transnational Criminal Cases: A Comparative Institutional Analysis Approach to the
Problem, 26 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 62 (2008); Thomas G. Snow, The Investigation and Prosecution of
White Collar Crime: International Challenges and the Legal Tools Available to Address Them,11 WM.
& MARY BILL RTS. J. 209 (2002).
124. See James B. Jacobs & Dimitra Blitsa, Sharing Criminal Records: The United States, the
European Union and Interpol Compared, 30 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 125 (2008).
125. Governmental crime information includes not only the information provided by its domestic
public (flow “a” in Chart I) and choke point private actors (flow “b” in Chart I), but also the
information collected by itself (e.g. criminal history records) and the results of any information
analysis carried out by the government. Flow of crime information originated from choke point
private actors and public are a crucial but partial portion of governmental crime information. Thus,
the focus of this analysis is to show how governmental crime information can reach, either directly or
indirectly through international organizations or foreign states, the foreign choke point private actors
in need of such information to deter crime. Other possible crime information flows that have no or
remote relationship with this purpose are not studied. This Article does not consider other possible
information flows, apart from their feasibility and practicality as a systemic legal regime, originating
from choke point private or public actors beyond flows “a” and “b” in Chart I (e.g. domestic choke
point private actors to foreign governments or IOs or overall/foreign choke point private actors or
overall public; domestic public to foreign governments or IOs or overall/foreign choke point private
actors or overall public). This does not mean that these possible but unaddressed information flows
are not necessary. As long as feasibility and practicality are satisfied, these flows should be
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Chart I: Contemporary Architecture of International Top-Down
Vertical Cooperation

Crime information flow paths 126
The following is a description of each information source in Chart I
and some examples of the potential sources of information 127 along each
numbered flow path:
1. INTERPOL’s International Child Sexual Exploitation image database;

encouraged, ideally along with the provider of governmental crime information, to support better
instantaneous, international sharing of crime information. These flows would become more crucial
when other sources of governmental crime information are absent. For instance, information sharing
between choke point private actors in the United States is encouraged under Section 314(b) of the
USA PATRIOT Act by providing safe harbor for voluntarily sharing information between financial
institutions that may involve possible terrorist or money laundering activities. See FIN. CRIMES
ENFORCEMENT NETWORK, Section 314(b) Fact Sheet,
https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/shared/314bfactsheet.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3VK3-JEM6].
As the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (“FinCEN”) does not provide financial institutions the
governmental information corresponding to the information they voluntarily share, this section of the
USA PATRIOT Act should be strongly encouraged. Similarly, information sharing between choke
point private actors at the international level should be encouraged. Finally, based on the Zero Day
Initiative in the United States, information flow from public to choke point private actors is
encouraged on a contractual basis. See Mohit Kumar, New Internet Explorer Zero-Day Vulnerability
Publicly Disclosed, THE HACKER NEWS (May 21, 2014), http://thehackernews.com/2014/05/internetexplorer-zero-day.html [https://perma.cc/FX7Y-5Z53] (“Zero Day Initiative is a program for
rewarding security researchers for responsibly disclosing vulnerabilities.”). This initiative encourages
the public, which does not have a duty to report crime, to do so anyway, thus increasing crime
deterrence. Id.
126. The list of precedents for each flow of crime information is not exhaustive.
127. Other than the international sources, such as the U.N., EU, and INTERPOL, domestic
sources given as examples in this Article solely focus on U.S. laws or policies.
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DNA Gateway; Fingerprint database 128
2. INTERPOL’s I-Checkit program 129
3. United Nations Security Council 1373 Sanction Committee’s list of
terror organizations and terrorists; INTERPOL’s list of wanted
persons (Red Notice) or persons presenting an imminent threat
(Yellow Notice); Financial Action Task Force (“FATF”) high-risk and
non-cooperative jurisdictions list (formerly, NCCT List) 130
4. Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government
of the United States of America for the Sharing of Visa and
Immigration Information; The Nordic Mutual Assistance Convention
on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters (“The Nordic
Mutual Assistance Convention”); Council Directive 2014/107/EU
amending Directive 2011/16/EU on Administrative Cooperation in the
Field of Taxation (“DAC2”) 131

128. IOs work as database centers and allow access only to authorized government authorities
through their own platforms. For instance, INTERPOL, through its International Child Sexual
Exploitation image database, DNA Gateway, Fingerprint database, SLTD, and others, collects
information in criminal matters from each member state and provides access to the shared information
to authorized state authorities of the member states. See INTERPOL, Databases,
http://www.interpol.int/INTERPOL-expertise/Databases [https://perma.cc/LXZ5-JLKW].
129. Unlike flow “1”, an international database center allows access not only to government
authorities, but also to choke point private actors registered with IOs. For instance, INTERPOL,
through its SLTD, collects information from member states and enables airlines, through its I-Checkit
program, to query against the SLTD. See Shelley, supra note 3.
130. IOs work as database centers and allow access to the overall public, including choke point
private actors. For instance, United Nations Security Council 1267 Committee collects information
about terrorist organizations and individuals from member states and publicizes the list. See S.C. Res.
1267, (Oct. 15, 1999). INTERPOL, under its Notices program, collects information about wanted
persons (“Red Notice”) or persons presenting imminent threat (“Yellow Notice”), etc., and publicizes
the list. The publications are made through the Internet, allowing access for the general public. See
INTERPOL, Notices, http://www.interpol.int/INTERPOL-expertise/Notices [https://perma.cc/C9FT5745].
131. A state’s cooperation with another state generally depends on international or mutual legal
assistance treaties (“MLATs”) in which both states are members. However, contemporary MLATs
generally do not provide international instantaneous sharing. The information under MLATs is
reactively exchanged from one state to another for a specific crime under legal proceedings. It has a
long process, going through multiple state authorities—a designated central state authority, diplomatic
channels, and/or a state authority in charge of the requested information—of both the requesting and
requested states with “duplicate checking of paperwork.” Gail Kent, The Mutual Legal Assistance
Problem Explained, THE CENTER FOR INTERNET AND SOCIETY (Feb. 23, 2015),
http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/blog/2015/02/mutual-legal-assistance-problem-explained
[https://perma.cc/JM7A-GVGB]. Sometimes, the process is more complex when the “legislation
requir[es] communication [to] be [made] via the traditional postal service.” Id. (“The UN Cybercrime
Study of 2013 indicates that most countries ‘reported median response times of . . . 150 days for
mutual legal assistance requests, received and sent . . . . It is clear that the use of formal cooperation
mechanisms occurs on a timescale of months, rather than days.”).
When there exist no such MLATs, the international laws imposing a “duty to report crime” instead
provide a basis of mutual legal assistance and mutual law enforcement cooperation between states
with no such mutual treaty. See UNCAC, supra note 18, art. 46(9)(a), 48(2). They generally follow
the traditional purview of MLATs. Though they offer more instantaneous direct information exchange
between state authorities for the early identification of the crime by detaching law enforcement
cooperation from complicated mutual legal assistance, these exchanges of information are still
reactive. See id. art. 46(1), (2), (13); art. 48(1)(a), (f).
However, there is an emergence of MLATs opting for proactive sharing regimes with less
complicated, if not instantaneous, channels. For instance, the United States and Canada agreed to
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5. Vulnerability Equity Process sharing the vulnerabilities in telecom or
computer systems; Launching Automated Indicator Sharing based on
2015 Cyber Security Information Sharing Act 132
6. Designation of terrorist organizations pursuant to Section 219 of the
Immigration and Nationality Act; Designation of global terrorists
under Executive Order (E.O.) 13,224; Public notification of sex
offenders under the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act 133
7. Does not exist 134
a. General public’s obligation to report felonies pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
§ 4 (Misprision of Felony); Voluntary reporting with reward (DoddFrank or Qui Tam Act)

share visa and immigration information to allow immigration officers to “have timely access to current
and accurate information” to “further the prevention, investigation, or punishment of acts that would
constitute a crime.” The Agreement Between the Government of Canada and the Government of the
United States of America for the Sharing of Visa and Immigration Information, pmbl. & art. 2(b),
U.S.-Can., Dec. 13, 2012, T.I.A.S. No. 13-1121. Regarding tax matters, the Nordic countries and the
EU employed automatic information exchange to combat tax fraud and evasion. See Avtal om
handräckning i skatteärenden, art. 11(1), http://www.norden.org/en/om-samarbejdet-1/nordicagreements/treaties-and-agreements/taxation-affairs/avtal-om-handraeckning-i-skatteaerenden
[https://perma.cc/C54Y-3VZD]; Directive 2014/107/EU of 9 December 2014 amending Directive
2011/16/EU as regards Mandatory Automatic Exchange of Information in the Field of Taxation, art. 1
(2), O.J. (L 359) 1 (2014). Furthermore, the OECD developed a global model of automatic exchange
endorsed by the G20 with further expectation of full implementation at the global level. See OECD,
Standard for Automatic Exchange of Financial Account Information 6 (2014),
https://www.oecd.org/ctp/exchange-of-tax-information/automatic-exchange-financial-accountinformation-common-reporting-standard.pdf [https://perma.cc/68J8-P53Z].
132. This flow illustrates providing governmental information to choke point private actors, which
is a principle to justify domestic “duty to report crime” law with criminal penalties. For instance, U.S.
Homeland Security, under its Launching Automated Indicator Sharing program (based on the 2015
Cyber Security Information Sharing Act), allows choke point private actors to instantaneously access
governmental information on threat indicators. See Mark Pomerleau, DHS Stands up Public-Private
Cyber Info Sharing Platform, GCN (Mar 30, 2016), https://gcn.com/articles/2016/03/30/dhs-ais.aspx
[https://perma.cc/ND7V-H6VW]; Brad S. Karp, Federal Guidance on the Cybersecurity Information
Sharing Act of 2015, HARV. L. SCHOOL FORUM ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND FIN. REGULATION
(March 3, 2016), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2016/03/03/federal-guidance-on-the-cybersecurityinformation-sharing-act-of-2015/ [https://perma.cc/8KAC-PEGM]. The U.S. government, under
Vulnerability Equity Process, disseminates the governmental information on vulnerabilities in telecom
or computer systems to private sectors. See NAT’L SEC. AGENCY, Commercial and Government
Information Technology and Industrial Control Product or System Vulnerabilities Equities Policy and
Process, at 1 (Feb. 16, 2010) https://www.eff.org/files/2016/01/18/37-3_vep_2016.pdf
[https://perma.cc/A4XK-ZW7F] (“This document establishes policy and responsibilities for
disseminating information about vulnerabilities discovered by the United States Government (USG) or
its contractors, or disclosed to the USG by the private sector or foreign allies in Government Off-TheShelf (GOTS), Commercial Off-The-Shelf (COTS), or other commercial information technology or
industrial control products or systems (to include both hardware or software).”).
133. Some governmental information is publicized to the general public. For instance, the U.S.
Department of Justice publicizes its list of terrorists and terrorist organizations. See The Immigration
and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(1) (2004); see also Exec. Order No. 13,224, 66 Fed. Reg.
49,079 (Sept. 23, 2001). In addition, in the United States, information about sex offenders is available
to the public on the web. See Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act, 34 U.S.C. §§ 20901–
20962 (2006).
134. Although this possible information flow would allow domestic choke point private actors
direct access to foreign governmental information, no legal regime currently provides such access.
However, if available, this channel would be the only one closest to the ideal international
instantaneous sharing of information between government and private entities, as it does not need to
go through any other intermediaries.

108

Washburn Law Journal

[Vol. 57

b. Financial institution’s mandatory reporting of suspicious transactions
to national authorities pursuant to 31 U.S.C. § 5318(g) and its
corresponding regulations; Electronic communication service
providers’ and remote computing service providers’ mandatory
reporting of child pornography pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2258A;
Voluntary reporting with reward (Dodd-Frank or Qui Tam Act);
Voluntary reporting of cyber threat indicator under 2015 Cyber
Security Information Sharing Act.
Each of the crime information flow-paths identified in Chart I has
distinctive characteristics involving different levels of actors in
information transmission. The successful instantaneous sharing of such
information must meet three conditions: horizontal accountability, vertical
accountability, and proportionality to privacy/reputational harm. Those
three conditions are discussed in turn below.
i. Horizontal Accountability 135
Sharing information at an international level is difficult due to the
absence of a single supra-national government with control and command
authority. Instead, individual states compete to safeguard their own
national interests. 136 Formalized international information sharing seems
even more difficult. Like individuals, 137 states are more likely to share
information with other states when they are in an amicable, not
conflicting, relationship. But relationships may change over time,
depending on national interests. Thus, even when there is a present
common interest in sharing national security information, the state will not
share information if it fears defection. 138
In contrast, institutionalist theorists argue that states voluntarily agree
to be bound by promises made to other states, even in the absence of the
135. From the perspective of global governance, I adopt the term “horizontal accountability,”
often used in domestic governance research. See Guillermo A. O’Donnell, Delegative Democracy, 5 J.
OF DEM. 55, 61 (1994) (“[A]ccountability runs not only vertically, making elected officials answerable
to the ballot box, but also horizontally, across a network of relatively autonomous powers (i.e., other
institutions) that can call into question, and eventually punish, improper ways of discharging the
responsibilities of a given official.”).
136. Anne L. Herbert, Cooperation in International Relations: A Comparison of Keohane, Haas
and Franck, 14 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 222, 226 (1996).
137. Claudia Toma & Fabrizio Butera, Hidden Profiles and Concealed Information: Strategic
Information Sharing and Use in Group Decision Making, 35 PERS. SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL 793, 803–04
(2009) (illustrating that individuals with cooperative incentives are significantly more likely to pool
unshared information with other team members than the individuals with competitive incentives);
WOLFGANG STEINEL ET AL., THE GOOD, THE BAD AND THE UGLY THING TO DO WHEN SHARING
INFORMATION: REVEALING, CONCEALING AND LYING DEPEND ON SOCIAL MOTIVATION,
DISTRIBUTION AND IMPORTANCE OF INFORMATION 27 (2010) (describing that individuals are more
likely to withhold or falsify information when they have noncooperative selfish motives).
138. JAMES IGOE WALSH, THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICS OF INTELLIGENCE SHARING, 47–48
(Colum. Univ. Press 2009).
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supra-national government, for their shared interest. There are many
interests that states share, “which in turn generate a demand for
international institutions and rules that states will voluntarily agree to
follow.” 139
Whether a realist or an institutionalist perspective is adopted,
formalized information sharing at the international level with respect to
crime is not a far-fetched idea. For all states, public security, as with
public health and environment, is a public good to be protected. Similarly,
crimes, as with epidemics and global warming, are public evils to be
deterred. In this interconnected globalized world, public security “can
only be provided efficiently at the international rather than national
level.” 140 Accordingly, states have voluntarily agreed to share certain
crime information, such as DNA, fingerprints, and sexual exploitation
images through INTERPOL with other states. 141 International treaties,
described above as “duty to report crime” provisions, are manifestations of
states’ willingness to cooperate to achieve their common goals on crime
detection and deterrence.
Yet, sharing crime information does not always coincide with a
state’s interests. For instance, states whose main source of economic
interest originates from their strong bank secrecy laws might have a robust
self-interest in not sharing suspicious transactions with other states.142
Additionally, when crimes are committed by other states, it can be akin to
a matter of national security. Considering that cyber-attacks are
sometimes committed by states themselves, 143 the states where victims are
located might have a strong interest in not sharing such information with

139. Herbert, supra note 136, at 226.
140. Martin Brookes & Zaki Wahhaj, Global Public Goods Arguments for Collective Action,

INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL ON HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY 1 (2001),
http://www.ichrp.org/files/papers/94/108_-_Global_Public_Goods__Arguments_for_Collective_Action_Brookes__Martin__Wahhaj__Zaki__2001.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2SL7-7DNK].
141. See Interpol Databases, supra note 128.
142. Keen & Ligthart, supra note 76, at 86 (2004) (“Here the starting point is the observation that
by providing information to foreign tax authorities a country makes itself less attractive to foreign
investors—which can hardly be in its own best interests. Thus, as stressed by Tanzi and Zee (2001) in
an early discussion of these issues, it is far from clear that information exchange agreements can be
expected to be self-enforcing.”).
143. See Ellen Nakashima et al., U.S., Israel Developed Flame Computer Virus to Slow Iranian
POST
(June
19,
2012),
Nuclear
Efforts,
Officials
Say,
WASH.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/us-israel-developed-computer-virus-toslow-iranian-nuclear-efforts-officialssay/2012/06/19/gJQA6xBPoV_story.html?utm_term=.6f9c90bb5766
[https://perma.cc/XAD7LM6Y]; US DEP’T OF DEF., Department of Defense Cyberspace Policy Report, at 9 (2011),
https://fas.org/irp/eprint/dod-cyber.pdf [https://perma.cc/67BJ-Y55E] (declaring that cyber attacks
could be considered acts of war); James A. Lewis & Katrina Tilmin, Cyber Security and Cyberwar:
Preliminary Assessment of National Doctrine and Organization, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC AND INT’L
STUDIES
3,
http://unidir.org/files/publications/pdfs/cybersecurity-and-cyberwarfare-preliminaryassessment-of-national-doctrine-and-organization-380.pdf [https://perma.cc/2CVT-BKEY]
(identifying 33 nations “includ[ing] cyberwarfare in their military planning and organization”).
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other states for national security reasons. States may also be unwilling to
share information relating to crimes such as terrorism, in which political
interpretation, 144 and states themselves, are involved.
In this context, as argued by the realists, a state might follow its selfinterest by cheating others—obtaining more than the necessary
information from others or providing less than the necessary information
to others 145—even if that state voluntarily agreed to be bound by the
promise it made to share information. Scholars say, “international law has
no life of its own, has no special normative authority . . . and there is no
reason to expect states to comply with treaties when their interests and
powers change.” 146
Accordingly, for this type of crime information, horizontal
accountability—accountability to information sharing of other states—is a
crucial element of the ideal regime for global regulation of a “duty to
report crime” to overcome the realist arguments. Without horizontal
accountability, in order for choke point private actors to access the
required foreign governmental crime information, both governments
giving and receiving information would have to rely on the honesty of the
opposite government. That means, governments providing information
believe that the information shared will not be used against them and the
government receiving information relies on the honesty of the government
providing the information. In the absence of mutual trust, state interest in
withholding domestic crime information and cheating others is what
directs the acts of states. 147
Based on the foregoing analysis, this Article recognizes that an
international body-centered structure, not a state-centered structure, needs
to be employed. An international body-centered structure—information
channel 1+2+3 and either 1, 2, or 3 in Chart I—needs to be established,
not simply as a data center but as an independent supervisory body to
secure horizontal accountability, thereby building trust between states and

144. An individual who is reproached as a terrorist in one state could be honored as a patriot in
another state.
145. RAKESH AGRAWAL & EVIMARIA TERZI, On Honesty in Sovereign Information Sharing, in
ADVANCES IN DATABASE TECHNOLOGY—EDBT 2006 240, 240 (Yannis Ioannidis et al. eds., 2006).
146. Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, The Limits of International Law, THE AM. ENTER. INST.
PUB.
POL’Y
RES.
3
(2005),
http://www.angelfire.com/jazz/sugimoto/law.pdf
FOR
[https://perma.cc/R7SL-TAX5].
147. The importance of state interest in determining whether to share information with other states
is already explained above. See WALSH, supra note 138, at 47–48 (arguing that states share
information based on state interest, rather than trust alone). However, this does not mean that trust
between states, though not a sole conclusive factor, can be ignored. Scholars have cited trust as an
important factor in information and knowledge sharing. See, e.g., Kurt T. Dirks & Donald L. Ferrin,
The Role of Trust in Organizational Settings, 12 ORG. SCI., 450 (2001); Niki Panteli & Siva
Sockalingam, Trust and Conflict Within Virtual Inter-Organizational Alliances: A Framework for
Facilitating Knowledge Sharing, 39 DECISION SUPPORT SYS. 599 (2005); Dale E. Zand, Trust and
Managerial Problem Solving, 17 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 229 (1972).
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overcoming the pursuit of states’ individual self-interest.
In such a structure, it is predicted the information will be proactively
shared with the foreign choke point private actors through an international
body, which will manage access to the information in a way that
eliminates the risk of abuse by foreign states. For example, in relation to
information on state-sponsored cyber incidents, the attacked state tends
not to share the information internationally, as it might expose the weak
points in its cyber security, potentially damaging its national security
interest. Although this concern is real, it is manageable. Contrary to
information sharing of a state with the foreign choke point private actors
directly through foreign states, where the source state of the information is
meant to be exposed to foreign states, the international data center could
choose not to disclose the source state of the information while providing
the required information to foreign choke point private actors.
The risk of abuse by states could be further eliminated if the
information at the international data center is provided directly to the
choke point foreign private actors, rather than indirectly through foreign
states, as in channel 2 in Chart I. For information that only choke point
private actors find useful in detecting crime, 148 such as information on
PEPs for financial institutions required to report suspicions of corruption,
only the choke point private actors should have access to the data center
while strictly prohibiting them from sharing such information with their
government.
This role of an international data center should be supported by the
role of an independent supervisory institution through regular inspections
and penalization 149 of noncompliance to combat the mistrust between
states by upholding horizontal accountability. It is crucial to encourage
honesty “with an auditing device that checks at an appropriate frequency
the integrity of the data submitted by the participants and penalizes by an
appropriate amount the cheating behaviors.”150 If states are free to share
only information that is preferential to them or to abuse the shared
information for their own interests, trust between states will never be
established.
148. Depending on the type of crime information, if the information shared, such as child
pornography, does not pose a risk of harm to the states sharing the information and is necessary for
crime investigation and prosecution, the international body may also provide state authorities direct
access to such information.
149. Instead of imposing a penalty, carrots could be used to induce information sharing. For
instance, information sharing for tax purposes could utilize such incentive mechanisms to make states
exchange information. See Keen & Ligthart, supra note 76, at 88 (“[T]here is no intrinsic reason why
some of the additional revenue collected as consequence of information exchange should not be
transferred to the country that provides it.”). However, it might be difficult to apply these tactics to
crime information sharing, as deterrence of crime does not necessarily generate profits to be shared as
an incentive with information providers.
150. AGRAWAL & TERZI, supra note 145, at 255.
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Regular inspections and penalization of noncompliance, whether
through soft or hard sanctions, would discourage states that voluntarily
agree to share crime information from cheating to pursue their selfinterest. Furthermore, it would also encourage non-member states to share
crime information, thus coming closer to the ideal of international sharing.
For instance, even with their soft law characteristics of non-binding
power, FATF Recommendations backed by review and soft sanction
penalties are widely adopted and implemented by member states and,
more importantly, by non-member states. 151 The FATF policy of “naming
and shaming” the Non-Cooperative Countries and Territories
and
taking
Recommendation
19
(formerly
(“NCCTs”) 152
Recommendation 21) countermeasures 153 against NCCTs encourages
member 154 and non-member states 155 to comply with its
151. FATF, FATF Steps up the Fight Against Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing (2012),
http://www.fatfgafi.org/publications/fatfrecommendations/documents/fatfstepsupthefightagainstmoneylaunderingandt
erroristfinancing.html [https://perma.cc/KH3H-Y3XY]. More than 180 governments, including thirtyfive states and two regional organizations (European Union, Gulf Cooperation Council) as members,
utilize FATF Recommendations as a global standard to combat money laundering and financing of
terrorism. Id.
152. FATF, About the Non-Cooperative Countries and Territories (NCCT) Initiative,
http://www.fatf-gafi.org/publications/high-riskandnon-cooperativejurisdictions/more/aboutthenoncooperativecountriesandterritoriesncctinitiative.html?hf=10&b=0&s=desc(fatf_releasedate)
[https://perma.cc/TE36-UE5Y]. This NCCT initiative was transformed into high-risk and noncooperative jurisdictions in 2008, but it maintains generally the same framework. FATF, High-Risk
and
Non-Cooperative
Jurisdictions,
http://www.fatf-gafi.org/publications/high-riskandnoncooperativejurisdictions/more/more-on-high-risk-and-non-cooperativejurisdictions.html?hf=10&b=0&s=desc(fatf_releasedate) [https://perma.cc/C7NP-BLBR].
153. FATF, International Standards on Combating Money Laundering and the Financing of
Terrorism & Proliferation 19 (Feb. 2012, updated Oct. 2016) [hereinafter International Standards],
http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/recommendations/pdfs/FATF_Recommendations.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4W22-5HJV].
Financial institutions should be required to apply enhanced due diligence measures to
business relationships and transactions with natural and legal persons, and financial
institutions, from countries for which this is called for by the FATF. The type of enhanced
due diligence measures applied should be effective and proportionate to the risks.Countries

should be able to apply appropriate countermeasures when called upon to do so by
the FATF. Countries should also be able to apply countermeasures independently
of any call by the FATF to do so. Such countermeasures should be effective and
proportionate to the risks.

Id.

154. JAE-MYONG KOH, SUPPRESSING TERRORIST FINANCING AND MONEY LAUNDERING, 162–63
(2006). The formal policy against member states is as follows:
1. Requiring the members to provide regular reports on their progress in implementing the
Recommendations within a fixed timeframe;
2. Sending a letter from the FATF President to the relevant minister(s) in the member
jurisdiction drawing their attention to non-compliance with the FATF Recommendations;
3. Arranging a high-level mission to the member jurisdiction in question to reinforce this
message;
4. In the context of the application of Recommendation 21 by its members, issuing a formal
FATF statement to the effect that a member jurisdiction is insufficiently in compliance with
the FATF Recommendations; and,
5. Suspending the jurisdiction’s membership of the FATF until the Recommendations have
been implemented.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
155. The formal policy against non-member states is as follows:
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Recommendations. The member states that were once subjected to the
above measures, such as Turkey 156 and Austria, 157 proceeded to take
necessary steps to implement the Recommendations. In 2000 and 2001,
forty-seven jurisdictions were reviewed under the NCCTs process; twentythree jurisdictions were identified as NCCTs. 158 However, since June 1,
2005, only Myanmar, Nauru, and Nigeria remained on the list.159
Following the pressure from FATF, the three jurisdictions made genuine
improvements to implement the FATF Recommendations, resulting in
Nauru being delisted in October 2005, Nigeria in June 2006, and
Myanmar in October 2006. 160 The OECD also takes similar measures
against non-cooperative nations in tax matters. 161
In contrast, a state-centered information sharing structure—
information channels through flows 4 and 5, 6 or 7 of Chart I—whether a
legal regime or not, is likely to fail to secure horizontal accountability and
to provide the required crime information to choke point private actors. A
state tends to withhold or distort the information for interrelated reasons:
lack of trust, pursuit of self-interest, and a risk of information abuse by
other states. Mutual review and inspection between states may curb these
risks to some extent. However, in terms of cost, it would be a feasible or
efficient solution for bilateral information sharing, but not for international
information sharing, which this paper suggests as an ideal regime.
1. Actions to put an end to the detrimental rules and practices
(i) Actions designed to encourage non-cooperative jurisdictions to adopt laws in
compliance with FATF recommendations; and,
(ii) Application of Recommendation 21
2. Counter-measures designed to protect economies against money of unlawful origin
(i) Customer identification obligations for financial institutions in FATF members with
respect to financial transactions carried out with or by individuals or legal entities
whose account is in a “non-cooperative jurisdiction”;
(ii) Specific requirements for financial institutions in FATF members to pay special
attention to or to report financial transactions conducted with individuals or legal
entities having their account at a financial institution[] established in a “noncooperative jurisdiction”; and,
(iii) Conditioning, restricting, targeting or even prohibiting financial transactions with
non-cooperative jurisdictions.
Id. at 164–65 (internal citations omitted).
156. See FATF, Annual Report: 1996–1997, Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering,
Monitoring the Implementation of Anti-Money Laundering Measures 10–11 (June 1997)
http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/1996%201997%20ENG.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3NAE-WFG6].
157. FATF, Annual Report: 1999–2000, Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering,
Improving Members’ Implementation of the Forty Recommendations 20–22 (June 22, 2000)
http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/1999%202000%20ENG.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4XQ6-7P7N].
158. KOH, supra note 154, at 165.
159. Id.
160. FATF, Annual Review of Non-Cooperative Countries and Territories 2006–2007: Eighth
NCCT Review 2 (Oct. 12, 2007) http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/2006
%202007%20NCCT%20ENG.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y7EX-FGZK].
161. See Keen & Ligthart, supra note 76, at 102–03 (“In April 2002, the OECD published a
blacklist of seven noncooperative tax havens not willing to enter such commitments, against which
OECD members had reserved the right to undertake defensive measures.”) (emphasis in original).
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Furthermore, the lack of an enforceable penalty of a state over noncompliant states will direct states to behave by following the logic of state
interest rather than legal agreements.
ii. Vertical Accountability
When the governmental crime information shared with choke point
private actors is the outcome of administrative discretion, which affects
the rights or interests of the subjects whose information is shared, it is an
administrative decision that should ensure accountability—vertical
accountability—to the subjects affected. For some of the governmental
crime information shared that is described below, an administrative
agency exercises its discretion in establishing the information.
Governmental crime information about past crimes that have been
previously decided and reviewed by the judiciary generally does not
provide room for discretion to regulatory bodies. For example, in the
United States, information about the name, current location, and past
offenses of sex offenders is shared with choke point private actors through
publication on a government website, as long as the offenders are
convicted of the sex offenses specified under the Sex Offender
Registration and Notification Act. 162 Many other states have adopted
similar laws. 163 Judicial review determines the information that should be
shared with the public, which certainly includes choke point private actors.
In addition, the governmental crime information reported by the
victims of crime about objective facts does not require any further
administrative discretion for it to be shared with choke point private
actors. When U.S. passports are reported lost or stolen, they are added to
an electronic database after a formal verification for accuracy by
comparing the information stored in the Passport Information Electronic
Records System owned and operated by the Bureau of Consular
Affairs. 164 The victim choke point private actors participating in the
Automated Indicator Sharing under the 2015 Cyber Security Information
Sharing Act share their information on cyber threat indicators with other
participating choke point private actors managed through a Department of
Homeland Security (“DHS”) system in the Department’s National
Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center. The indicators are
not validated by DHS. 165
162. 34 U.S.C. §§ 20901–62 (2017).
163. See generally Global Overview of Sex Offender Registration and Notification Systems, OFF.
OF SEX OFFENDER SENTENCING, MONITORING, APPREHENDING, REGISTERING, AND TRACKING (Apr.
2014), http://www.smart.gov/pdfs/GlobalOverview.pdf [https://perma.cc/49CP-687H].
164. Privacy Impact Assessment: Online Passport Lost & Stolen System, DEPT. OF STATE 2
(2008), https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/242420.pdf [https://perma.cc/T8BN-5GLX].
165. Automatic
Indicator
Sharing
(AIS),
US-CERT,
https://www.us-cert.gov/ais
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Other governmental crime information tends to be the subject of
administrative discretion. In the United States, a list of foreign terrorist
individuals or organizations is created by the Secretary of State or the
Secretary of the Treasury based on the governmental crime
information. 166 This list typically includes both classified and open source
information that names the foreign individuals or entities that have
committed, or pose a significant risk of committing, acts of terrorism
threatening the security of U.S. nationals or national security, foreign
policy, or the U.S. economy. 167 Cyber child pornography clearinghouses,
such as The National Center for Missing & Exploited Children
(“NCMEC”) in the United States, 168 review and verify the images of
cyber child pornography listed by the ISPs, who usually are third parties in
relation to the crime, before handing the images over to the law
enforcement agencies and sharing this with other choke point private
actors. 169
This discretionary decision made by the administrative agency does
not simply assist choke point private actors in providing better crime
detection, but also aids in deciding who should be the subject of greater
scrutiny by the choke point private actors, thus affecting the rights or
interests of the subject of the shared information.
Regulation of a “duty to report crime” generally only triggers a
reporting duty to verify the crimes that are suspected. However, states
often impose an obligation to deny service to the suspicious individuals or
entities to deter further crimes. Thus, when a government shares its crime
information, the private sector actor will deny its services to the subjects

[https://perma.cc/8DAA-LVHD].
166. Exec. Order No. 13,224, 66 Fed. Reg. 49,079 (Sept. 25, 2001).
167. Id.
168. Appellant Opening Brief at 14, United States v. Ackerman, 831 F.3d 1292 (10th Cir. 2016)
(No. 14-3265). Depending on the state, the child pornography information clearing house is
established either as a governmental organization or non-governmental organization. However, even
non-governmental clearing houses, such as NCMEC, are funded in part by federal grants and
authorized by federal law to work as a government agent through its partnership with government.
United States v. Keith, 980 F. Supp. 2d 33, 38–39 (D. Mass. 2013); see also Programs and Services,
THE NAT’L CENT. FOR MISSING & EXPLOITED CHILDREN, http://www.missingkids.com/Programs
[https://perma.cc/73NG-MTVE]. More importantly, a U.S. court recently decided that NCMEC is a
government agency, not a private entity. United States v. Ackerman, 831 F.3d 1292, 1296–98 (10th
Cir. 2016) (“Focusing in particular on NCMEC’s CyberTipline functions . . . illustrates and confirms
the special law enforcement duties and powers it enjoys . . . . [S]o much law and evidence suggest[s]
NCMEC qualifies as a governmental entity.”). Besides, these non-governmental clearing houses
sometimes have access to governmental databases, as the Internet Watch Foundation (“IWF”) of UK
does by making hash lists from the images from the Home Office’s new Child Abuse Image Database
(“CAID”), not just from public reporting or reporting from ISPs. Accordingly, this Article categorizes
the information of these clearing houses for child pornography as governmental information. See
Hash List “Could be Game-Changer” in the Global Fight Against Child Sexual Abuse Images Online,
INTERNET WATCH FOUND. (Aug 10, 2015) https://www.iwf.org.uk/about-iwf/news/post/416-hash-listcould-be-game-changer-in-the-global-fight-against-child-sexual-abuse-images-online
[https://perma.cc/AD9P-6P2F].
169. Appellant Opening Brief, supra note 168, at 14.
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of the information, based on the information shared. In relation to child
pornography, some jurisdictions (e.g. Austria, 170 Germany, 171 Spain,172
and Taiwan173) require ISPs to remove or disable access to illegal
content. 174 Therefore, when the governmental information about child
pornography (e.g. hash values of child pornography or a list of URLs of
child pornography websites) is shared with its ISPs, the ISPs will remove
or disable access to the content solely based on the shared information,
thereby encroaching on the rights or interests of the content owners. 175
Without such a duty, choke point private actors tend not to take a risk
of dealing with the subjects of the shared governmental crime information,
thus making it difficult, if not impossible, for them to enjoy their rights or
interests. Although the United States generally does not impose a duty to
remove or disable access on ISPs, 176 the ISPs voluntarily do so. Their
terms of service generally give ISPs the right to remove and disable access
to illegal content, and ISPs voluntarily exercise this right against cyber
child pornography. 177 In the United States, the NCMEC agreed “to use
170. Bundesgesetz, mit dem bestimmte rechtliche Aspekte des elektronischen Geschäfts- und
Rechtsverkehrs geregelt werden [Federal Act Governing Certain Legal Aspects of Electronic
Commercial and Legal Transactions], BGBI. I Nr. 152/2001 § 16(1)2 (Dec. 21, 2001) (Austria)
https://www.ris.bka.gv.at/Dokumente/Erv/ERV_2001_1_152/ERV_2001_1_152.pdf
[https://perma.cc/TS4U-8ELN].
171. The Telemediengesetz [the Telemedia Act], EGRL 179/2007, Abschnitt 3 § 10 (Feb. 26,
2007) (Ger.) https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/tmg/__10.html [https://perma.cc/4M3L-8LFJ].
172. De Servicios de la Sociedad de la Informacion y de Comercio Electronico [The Information
Society and Electronic Commerce Services Law], Ley 34/2002, art. 16(1)(a) (July 11, 2002) (Spain),
http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=268430 [https://perma.cc/FQ93-Q4SF].
173. Regulations for the Rating of Internet Content, GIO Press Release 0930622071-A, art. 8
(Apr. 26, 2004) (Taiwan) http://www.ncc.gov.tw/english/files/10092/68_572_100923_1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/NW4H-YNCG].
174. Weixiao Wei, Online Child Sexual Abuse Content: The Development of a Comprehensive,
Transferable International Internet Notice and Takedown System, INTERNET WATCH FOUND. 98
(2011), https://www.iwf.org.uk/sites/ . . . [https://perma.cc/87ZZ-VXUR].
175. A research study experimented how ISPs react to the complaints about alleged copyright
infringement on a website that actually contained perfectly legal material. In the case of UK ISPs,
they “took the site down almost immediately effectively censoring . . . legal content without
investigation.” Christian Ahlert et al., How ‘Liberty’ Disappeared from Cyberspace: The Mystery
Shopper Tests Internet Content Self-Regulation 3 (2004) (emphasis in original),
http://pcmlp.socleg.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/liberty.pdf [https://perma.cc/5DQC-CP76];
see also Richard Clayton, Judge & Jury? How “Notice and Take Down” Gives ISPs an Unwanted
Role
in
Applying
the
Law
to
the
Internet
(July
26,
2000),
http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~rnc1/Judge_and_Jury.html [https://perma.cc/9LCX-JDCX] (“[Notice and
Take Down] can lead to injustices as lawful material is censored because ISPs cannot take the risk that
a court will eventually agree that it can indeed remain available.”).
176. Exec. Order No. 13,224, 66 Fed. Reg. 49,079 (Sept. 23, 2001). In the case of Pennsylvania,
the state law imposes the duty to remove or disable access when on notice by the Attorney General.
18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 7622 (2014). In addition, the notice is not a pure administrative discretionary
decision. Id. It has to be reviewed by the court, as it requires the Attorney General to obtain the order
from the court. Id.
177. Most ISPs seem to reserve the right to remove illegal content. See, e.g., Privacy & Terms,
GOOGLE, https://www.google.com/intl/en/policies/terms/ [https://perma.cc/SU2G-23UR] (“We may
review content to determine whether it is illegal or violates our policies, and we may remove or refuse
to display content that we reasonably believe violates our policies or the law.”); Terms of Use,
VERIZON, http://www.verizon.com/about/terms-conditions/terms-of-use [https://perma.cc/L6AUW5TP] (“We reserve the right to: (a) use, copy, display, store, transmit and reformat data
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NCMEC’s database of web sites to identify those containing child
pornography and to then allow any cable operator that owns or controls a
server used by the site to shut it down.” 178 The three biggest ISPs in the
world, Verizon, Time Warner Cable, and Sprint, have agreed “to purge
their servers of all child pornography Web sites identified by the
[NCMEC].” 179
Similarly, financial institutions, working from the list of individuals
and entities designated as terrorists by the government, not only report
suspicious activities to government authorities, but also freeze their assets.
Unlike child pornography, this duty to freeze is imposed by international
law 180 as well as domestic laws. 181
Administrative laws require the discretion of government agencies to
be exercised “in a manner that is informed and responsive to the wide
range of social and economic interests and values affected by their
decisions,” 182 which can be described here as vertical accountability,
through legal procedures and judicial review. The ex-ante mechanism is
that states usually allow people to participate in rule-making procedures
through a notice-and-comment procedure. 183 The ex-post mechanism is
that judicial review by the courts of the administrative decision is
available to the adversely affected parties. 184
However, with the emergence of global regulatory regimes, “the vast
increase in the reach and forms of transgovernmental regulation and
administration designed to address the consequences of globalized
interdependence” 185 has created an accountability vacuum at the
international level. “[P]olitical and legal accountability and control that
would apply to purely domestic regulatory measures” are absent from the
global regulatory decisions. 186 This lack of accountability damages the
legitimacy of the global regulatory regimes, “since public exercises of

transmitted over our network and to distribute such content to multiple Verizon servers for backup and maintenance purposes; and (b) block or remove any unlawful content you store on or
transmit to or from any Verizon server.”).
178. News Report, Attorney General Lynch to Remove Child Pornography Sites from the Internet,
GOV’T TECH. (July 23, 2008) http://www.govtech.com/security/Attorney-General-Lynch-to.html
[https://perma.cc/RXQ2-6PQX].
179. News Report, Leading ISPs Reach Agreement to Block Child Pornography, GOV’T TECH.
(June 10, 2008) http://www.govtech.com/security/Leading-ISPs-Reach-Agreement.html
[https://perma.cc/W4YF-QR59].
180. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1267, ¶ 4(b) (Oct. 15, 1999); S.C. Res. 1989, ¶ 1(a) (June 17, 2011); S.C.
Res. 2253, ¶ 2(a) (Dec. 17, 2015).
181. Exec. Order No. 13,224, 66 Fed. Reg. 49,079 (Sept. 23, 2001); 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(2).
182. Richard B. Stewart, U.S. Administrative Law: A Model for Global Administrative Law?, 68
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 63, 75 (2005).
183. Id. at 81.
184. Id. at 85.
185. Benedict Kingsbury et al., The Emergence of Global Administrative Law, 68 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 15, 16 (2005).
186. Stewart, supra note 182, at 69.
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power are lawful on condition that they do not violate these values and
principles.” 187
The suggested ideal legal regime for a “duty to report crime” is a type
of global regulatory regime that allows an administrative decision made in
one state to be applied in another state through the principle of mutual
recognition. 188 As with domestic governmental crime information, crime
information decided by a foreign administrative body and shared with
choke point private actors will affect the rights or interests of the
individuals whose information is shared.
This creates a risk of “short-circuiting the role of domestic
administrative law” 189 in securing vertical accountability. In order for
global regulation of a “duty to report crime” to effectively eliminate the
above risk, it is submitted there should be an international supervisory
body as an implementer 190 to secure both ex-ante and ex-post vertical
accountability, as in domestic administrative law.
Ex-ante vertical accountability may be established through
“intergovernmental regimes of administrative law standards and
mechanisms to which national administrations must conform.” 191
Intergovernmental regimes monitor and review the state’s implementation
of the procedural standards through mutual evaluation or periodic on-site
inspection. 192
The concern is that a foreign administrative decision may have been
made without following the same administrative law principles of the state
where its decision takes effect, thus rendering it invalid if it were made in
the affected state. The French Conseil d’Etat ruled against the lawfulness
of an entry on the SIS that had been made by another Member State,
Germany, because Germany failed to provide sufficient information for
the claimant regarding the listing of claimants in the Schengen system. 193
To obtain ex-post vertical accountability, a “top-down approach” of
global regulatory procedure is to be actualized by the international
supervisory body. 194 Although this demand for judicial review of global
regulatory regime is expected to be met with the “bottom-up approach”—

187. David Dyzenhaus, The Rule of (Administrative) Law in International Law, 68 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 127, 147 (2005).
188. Kalypso Nicolaidis & Gregory Shaffer, Transnational Mutual Recognition Regimes:
Governance Without Global Government, 68 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 263, 268 (2005) (suggesting
the use of the mutual recognition principle as to govern the recognition of foreign laws, regulations,
and standards among states).
189. Stewart, supra note 182, at 70.
190. Nicolaidis & Shaffer, supra note 188, at 282.
191. Kingsbury et al., supra note 185, at 16.
192. Id.
193. Elspeth Guild, Moving the Borders of Europe, U. OF NIJMEGEN, at 26 (May 30, 2001),
http://cmr.jur.ru.nl/cmr/docs/oratie.eg.pdf [https://perma.cc/FR33-BSJE].
194. Stewart, supra note 182, at 72.
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the extension of existing domestic administrative law principles 195—as in
the Hamssaoui and Forabosco case, 196 a “top-down approach,” especially
for the international regulatory network or body where judicial review is
absent, also continues to be developed. 197
For instance, the Security Council Resolution 1267 Committee is
responsible for compiling a consolidated list of terrorist individuals and
entities based on the information supplied by states. 198 “The listing
mechanism can have far-reaching domestic consequences.” 199 Not only
the state requesting the listing but also all the other states are required to
sanction the individuals or entities listed. 200 The 1267 Committee
provides a procedure for the listed individuals and entities to make a direct
petition and review request for delisting to the Office of the
Ombudsperson of the Committee instead of the courts in all member states
where their interests are affected. 201
For this purpose, among the channels of the proposed contemporary
architecture of international top-down vertical cooperation, this Article
suggests that an international body-centered structure—information
channel 1+2+3 and either 1, 2, or 3 in Chart I—should be employed, not a
state-centered structure—information channels through 4, 5, 6, or 7 of
Chart I.
Ex-ante vertical accountability can only be accomplished by an
international body-centered structure, as the state-centered structure lacks
an international centralized body to implement and supervise the
administrative standard and mechanism. Although it is true that ex-post
vertical accountability seems to be secured in both structures, through a
“bottom-up approach” in the state-centered structure and a “top-down
approach” in the international body-centered structure, the latter seems to
be more appropriate. While the rights and interests of the subjects of the
shared information will be affected internationally, as in the listings of the
1267 Committee, the effect of a “bottom-up approach” to secure vertical
accountability is limited only to the bottom local jurisdiction. Under the
latter approach, judicial review needs to be pursued in each individual
jurisdiction where the subject of the shared information aims to recover
his impinged interests or rights. Even if an international body-centered

195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.

Id. at 107.
Guild, supra note 193, at 26.
Kingsbury et al., supra note 185, at 57; see also Stewart, supra note 182, at 88–100.
S.C. Res. 1267, ¶ 4(b) (Oct. 15, 1999).
Dyzenhaus, supra note 187, at 141.
S.C. Res. 1267, ¶ 4(b) (Oct. 15, 1999). Referring to Committee 1267’s adopted Resolution
1373, “all States shall take certain actions against the financing of terrorist activities, among other
actions.” Dyzenhaus, supra note 187, at 141 (internal quotations omitted).
201. The Office of the Ombudsperson to the ISIL (Da’esh) & Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee, UN
(2017) https://www.un.org/sc/suborg/en/ombudsperson [https://perma.cc/4GRE-VAYR].
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structure adopts a “bottom-up approach,” the outcome of a judicial review
in a home state that upholds the rights and interests of the subject of the
shared information involves difficult and complicated procedures in order
for it to be acknowledged in other states. For example, before reformation
of the 1267 Committee to its current “top-down approach,” the persons
listed by the Committee had to challenge the listing in a domestic court,
and then go through a further complicated process at the international
level. 202
iii. Proportionality of Harm to Privacy and Reputation
The third and final element of the ideal regime is the requirement to
consider proportionality to privacy/reputational harm.
Some
governmental crime information shared with private choke point actors
could create a risk for two different but interrelated protected values: the
privacy right of the subject of the information and the subject’s reputation,
thus, further negatively affecting his or her business. 203 Though
interrelated, 204 the two values are not attached to one another. When the
subject of the shared information is a private entity, such entities have no
privacy right. 205 However, their reputation and interests that are damaged
by the shared information should still be considered.
The right to privacy is protected by states across the globe as a
human right. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(“ICCPR”), which has been ratified by 167 states, provides that “[n]o one
shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy”
and “[e]veryone has the right to the protection of the law against such
interference or attacks.”206 The EU has clearly articulated the right to
privacy under the European Convention for the Protection of Human
202. See E. Alexandra Dosman, For the Record: Designating “Listed Entities” for the Purposes of
Terrorist Financing Offenses at Canadian Law, 62 U. TORONTO FAC. OF L. REV. 1, 13 (2004). In
discussing the Guidelines established for the 1267 Committee, another author states:
An individual or organization that has been listed cannot apply to be delisted. A listed
person must petition his or her home country to request a review of the case, and the home
country then acts as the person’s advocate if the review is favorable. The home country has
to approach the government requesting the listing and attempt to persuade it to submit a joint
or separate request to the Security Council for delisting. The home country can then submit
the request even if the other government does not agree, but every member of the committee
has an effective veto on any request. If the committee cannot achieve consensus, then the
matter is remitted to the Security Council for final decision-making.
Dyzenhaus, supra note 187, at 141 n.60 (citing Dosman, supra).
203. See Kang, supra note 1, at 395, 399.
204. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 17, Dec. 16, 1966, 6 I.L.M. 368
(1967) [hereinafter International Covenant] (discussing protection of “privacy” together with
protection from unlawful attack on “honour and reputation”).
205. See FCC v. AT&T Inc., 562 U.S. 397 (2011) (holding that corporations do not have
“personal privacy” for the purposes of FOIA Exemption 7(C)); see also Robert Barnes, Do Companies
Have “Personal Privacy” Rights?, WASH. POST (Jan. 20, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2011/01/19/AR2011011907414.html [https://perma.cc/BE4L-WTTJ].
206. International Covenant, supra note 204, art. 17(1)–(2).
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Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“ECHR”) as a human right that should
be protected. 207 Although the U.S. Constitution does not specifically
mention the right to privacy, the Constitution has been interpreted by the
courts, including the U.S. Supreme Court, as providing for that right. 208
With the development of communication technology and an age
where the rapid and widespread movement of information is now the
norm, international society has recognized the importance of the
protection of informational privacy. 209 Information about oneself can
have serious effects on an individual’s life. Though the right to privacy is
difficult to define, 210 this Article regards it as an individual’s right to
control personal information with regards to both (1) types of information
and (2) manners of distribution and sharing of that information.
As for types of information, the right to privacy is not an absolute
right. Although Article 17 of the ICCPR does not contain a permissible
limitation clause, the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection
of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression (“Special
Rapporteur”) recognizes permissible limitations on the right to privacy,
stating that the right is subject to necessary, legitimate, and proportionate
restrictions. 211 Under the ECHR, the EU provides the exceptions where
privacy could be conceded: “[for] the interests of national security, public
safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of
disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the
protection of the rights and freedoms of others.” 212
Accordingly, depending on the content of the crime information
possessed by the government, the privacy right of an individual may be
restricted to various degrees. If the governmental information concerns
crimes that are serious or have been reviewed by the court, the right to
privacy is not likely to prevent public dissemination of that information.
For example, while information about terrorists is likely to be shared with
the public even without judicial review, information about sex offenders
involving crimes against children may be shared with the public after a
207. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 4
November
1950,
ETS
5,
art. 8,
[hereinafter
European
Convention]
http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf [https://perma.cc/B2JS-7A8T].
208. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484–85 (upholding the right to privacy in
marriage even when the right is not expressly protected under the First Amendment).
209. The
Right
to
Privacy
in
the
Digital
Age,
OHCHR,
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/DigitalAge/Pages/DigitalAgeIndex.aspx
[https://perma.cc/XB7UY2FE].
210. W. A. Parent, A New Definition of Privacy for the Law, 2 LAW & PHIL. 305, 305 (1983).
211. Frank La Rue, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the
Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, UN HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL, A/HRC/23/40, at 8
(2013),
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/RegularSession/Session23/A.HRC.23.40_EN
.pdf [https://perma.cc/R5QL-NZEV].
212. European Convention, supra note 207, art. 8(2).
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judicial review. On the other hand, information concerning less serious
crimes not reviewed by the court, such as PEP information as a risk
indicator to deter corruption, might have stronger, but not complete,
protection of the right to privacy.
Additionally, even when a legitimate expectation of an individual
exists that the governmental information about him or her will not be
disclosed, establishment of proportional manners of distribution and
sharing, as explained below, could overcome the privacy right protection.
Regarding disclosure of the public record (e.g. governmental crime
information), in many cases, U.S. courts have allowed the disclosure of
information if certain conditions are met: “(1) . . . the party [has] a
legitimate expectation that the materials or information will not be
disclosed[;] (2) . . . disclosure [is] nonetheless required to serve a
compelling state interest[;] (3) . . . the necessary disclosure [will] occur in
that manner which is least intrusive with respect to the right to
confidentiality.” 213 In recognizing this permissibility of limiting privacy,
the Special Rapporteur required that “[r]estrictive measures . . . must be
appropriate to achieve their protective function, they must be the least
intrusive instrument amongst those which might achieve the desired result,
and they must be proportionate to the interest to be protected.” 214
This proportionality can be attained through appropriate procedures
to restrict distribution of the information with the help of technical
solutions. For instance, INTERPOL allows the airlines participating in its
I-Checkit border screening system to query the SLTD database, not by
accessing the raw data directly, but by using the information provided by
the allegedly suspicious client, thus eliminating the risk of privacy
breaches. 215 Further, the SLTD database only includes a travel document
number, the form of a document, and country code, not the personal
data. 216 At the domestic level, in the case of the United States, technical
solutions are being employed to help eliminate child pornography on the
Internet. Thus, information about child pornography can be shared with
choke point private actors through the Hash Value Sharing Initiative of the
NCMEC, as a centralized data center, without worrying about potential
privacy breaches. This is because the NCMEC does not provide the child
pornography images, but only their representative “MD5 hash values.”217
213. Jones v. Jennings, 788 P.2d 732, 738 (Alaska 1990) (quoting Martinelli v. District Court, 612
P.2d 1083, 1091 (Colo. 1980)).
214. La Rue, supra note 211, at 9.
215. AirAsia Becomes First Airline to Pilot INTERPOL I-Checkit, INTERPOL (May 13, 2014),
http://www.interpol.int/News-and-media/News/2014/N2014-082 [https://perma.cc/6V3E-AEUX].
216. Id.
217. Sean Gallagher, Updated: How Verizon Found Child Pornography in its Cloud, ARS
TECHNICA (Mar. 5, 2013), https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2013/03/how-verizonfound-a-child-pornographer-in-its-cloud/ [https://perma.cc/XZJ6-NVMQ].

2018]

In Defense of the Global Regulation of a “Duty to Report Crime”

123

This means that choke point private actors can detect and confirm whether
the pornography they encounter in the course of their business is child
pornography that needs to be reported.
Apart from the right to privacy, preservation of reputation is crucial,
especially when the private entities that are not protected by privacy
rights 218 are victims of the crime whose information is shared. Disclosure
of such information about private entities as victims of crime damages
their reputations, thus significantly affecting their business outcomes. 219
Such a risk of reputational harm, particularly against a private entity who
reported the information as a victim to the government, would prevent
private entities from reporting to the government. 220
With regards to such governmental crime information, it is
recommended that disclosure be allowed to the greatest extent possible,
provided that technical solutions are used to ensure appropriate procedures
and restrictions are in place to control distribution of the information and
preserve the reputation of victim private entities. In the United States for
example, the Department of Defense’s cyber incidents information, which
might cause reputational harm to the victim, is shared only with strictly
limited authorized choke point private actors. 221 In addition, the
information is shared only to the extent necessary for detection and
deterrence of a cyber incident, and there is a requirement to minimize the
information that can identify the victim of the cyber incident.222
Similarly, the Automatic Indicator Sharing of the DHS does not disclose
the identity of the source of those shared cyber incident indicators to other
participants without affirmative consent.223 For this purpose, the DHS
employs strict measures and processes, which are regularly tested. 224
Overall, in relation to governmental crime information that
potentially encroaches on the privacy rights or reputational interest of the
subject of the information when shared, the disclosure should be limited in
proportion to the legitimate aims of disclosure, with the use of procedural
218. See FCC v. AT&T Inc., 562 U.S. 397 (2011); Preamble, International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, UN HUMAN RIGHTS (“[r]ecognizing that these rights derive from the inherent dignity
of the human person”).
219. See generally Cyber Thieves Looking for Their Next Target, BLUEFIN (Dec. 9, 2015),
https://www.bluefin.com/bluefin-news/cyber-thieves-looking-for-their-next-target/
[https://perma.cc/T629-SFCB] (explaining the total expenses incurred by the 2013 Target data breach).
220. See Kang, supra note 1, at 399.
221. See The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013, § 941(C)(3); see also 32
C.F.R. § 236.4(m)(1)–(4) (2015).
222. See 32 C.F.R. § 236.4(l) (2015); 32 C.F.R. § 236.2 (2015).
223. US-CERT, supra note 165.
224. Id. (“AIS has processes which: Perform automated analyses and technical mitigations to
delete PII that is not directly related to a cyber threat; Incorporate elements of human review on select
fields of certain indicators to ensure that automated processes are functioning appropriately; Minimize
the amount of data included in a cyber threat indicator to information that is directly related to a cyber
threat; Retain only information needed to address cyber threats; and Ensure any information collected
is used only for network defense or limited law enforcement purposes.”).

124

Washburn Law Journal

[Vol. 57

and technical measures to minimize the extent and scope of disclosure.
Accordingly, when choke point private actors rely on governmental
crime information that has been made freely available to the public—
information channels 3 and 6 in Chart I—unlike that shared only with
choke point private actors—information channels 1, 2, 4, 5, and 7 in Chart
I—the information shared is circumscribed by strict standards that exist to
protect privacy and reputational harm. In other words, the shareable
information is limited to past crimes, which are either serious or have been
reviewed by the courts. As properly demonstrated by Chart I, the
information available to choke point private actors through the public—
information channels 3 and 6—is about terrorist organizations and
individuals, 225 wanted suspects who have committed serious crimes that
satisfied the minimum penalty threshold, 226 or sex offenders against
children. 227
However, this limited governmental crime information, which is at
the same level of access as the public, fails to provide choke point private
actors with enough of the required crime information to carry out their
“duty to report crime” imposed by the government. Many times, choke
point private actors need information about crime that is less serious and
not proven to be committed. Information such as cyber incidents or
breaches that should be shared with choke point private actors to further
detect and deter such crimes cannot be shared by making them available to
the public because of the possible reputational harm to the victim
entities.228
Thus, to create the ideal regime, the governmental crime information
made available to the public—information channels 3 and 6 in Chart I—is
a necessary but not sufficient condition. The sufficient condition is
satisfied by sharing governmental crime information only with choke
point private actors—information channels 1, 2, 4, 5, and 7 in Chart I.
C. Practical Model for The Ideal Regime
Three criteria—horizontal accountability, vertical accountability, and
proportionality to privacy/reputational harm—are suggested for some but
not all top-down cooperations. Horizontal accountability is required for
information that triggers conflicts of interest between states, thus causing
states to cheat each other; vertical accountability should be required for

225. See S.C. Res. 1267 (Oct. 15, 1999); The Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1189(a)(1) (2004); Exec. Order No. 13,224, 66 Fed. Reg. 49,079 (Sept. 23, 2001).
226. See INTERPOL, Notices, http://www.interpol.int/INTERPOL-expertise/Notices
[https://perma.cc/C9FT-5745].
227. 42 U.S.C. §§ 16901–62; see also OFFICE OF SEX OFFENDER SENTENCING, supra note 163.
228. Kang, supra note 1, at 399–400.
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information established under the administrative discretion and which
invades the rights and interests of the subjects of the shared crime
information; finally, proportionality should be required for information
that encroaches on the right to privacy or reputation of the subjects of the
shared information.
To satisfy each criterion required by types of crime information
shared, the ideal regime for top-down cooperation should accordingly be
established as illustrated above. If global regulation of a “duty to report
crime” requires top-down cooperation, which will encompass all types of
information, the regime should satisfy all three criteria.
As illustrated earlier, in relation to vertical and horizontal
accountability, state centered information channels 4, 5, 6 or 7 in Chart I,
are likely to fail to satisfy these three requirements. Regarding the
proportionality to privacy/reputational harm, information channels 3 and 6
in Chart I, where choke point private actors access the publicized
governmental crime information, are limited to information on past and
serious crimes.
Accordingly, the one-size-fits-all regime should follow information
channel 2 in Chart I. A global regulatory body should be established that
would function as an international data center to consolidate the
governmental crime information and grant choke point private actors
direct access. It would also act as a supervisory body to review the
substance of the shared information and procedures of information
production with the authority to penalize noncompliance. Under this
common structure, specific procedures and technical solutions, such as
query-hit or direct access to raw data, would be implemented to allow
choke point private actors to access the database in the least intrusive
manner. The access would be differentiated based on the types of
information shared.
This one-size-fits-all regime of governmental crime information
sharing with choke point private reporters may not necessarily be a
farfetched idea, but simply one that is in an embryonic stage. Moreover,
INTERPOL, which has consolidated diverse types of governmental crime
information as a data center, could be the best possible choice for such a
regime on the condition that the supervisory role is expanded to meet the
three criteria discussed above.
INTERPOL took the initiative of opening its SLTD database, one of
its many crime information databases, to authorized choke point private
actors under the I-Checkit program. Although it is currently only for
airlines, it plans to expand the scope of choke point private actors to

126

Washburn Law Journal

[Vol. 57

include the hotel, banking, and maritime transportation sectors.229
Considering that these choke point private reporters of I-Checkit have no
“duty to report crime,” there is a stronger rationale to allow the choke
point private actors that have a “duty to report crime” to access requisite
INTERPOL databases.
Global regulations that establish a “duty to report crime” could
designate this INTERPOL database to be utilized as a platform for
governmental crime information sharing with choke point private actors,
just as the UNNDPS recommends member states to use INTERPOL
databases as a platform of police information sharing. 230 Alternatively, it
could also be supported by the UN Security Council in the same way that
Resolution 2178 identified INTERPOL as the “global law enforcement
information sharing” platform against foreign fighters. 231
IV. CONCLUSION
Returning to the hypothetical introduced at the beginning of this
Article, the foreign terrorists in that scenario might have been detected
much earlier if the airlines had a “duty to report crime” (i.e. bottom-up
vertical cooperation) and had access to the SLTD database (i.e. top-down
vertical cooperation) managed by INTERPOL. Even if there were no
immigration officers controlling the borders, as is the case with many
global-digital crimes, which freely trespass state boundaries, the airline
would have played its role as a frontline law enforcement officer.
Is it justifiable to shift such an obligation originally imposed on a
government to the private sector? Answering this question can only be
done by applying the complicated balancing test of culpability, as
explained in my previous Article.
However, given that the modus operandi of some crimes discussed
above is set within a globalized and digitalized context, there is a stronger
rationale for imposing such a duty on the private sector. The modern
context of crime often renders the traditional institutions and government
actors (e.g. border control officers) employed by the government for crime
detection somewhat powerless as the criminals abuse the networked space
controlled by the private sector. Recall that in the hypothetical, the funds
for terrorist activities were transferred to Paris through a financial network
without any inspection by the border control officers. Only the financial
institutions as choke point private actors could have detected it.
For the proposed “duty to report crime” regulations to be effective,

229. See Interpol I-Checkit Solution, supra note 14.
230. See UNNDPS, supra note 18, art. 1.
231. See S.C. Res. 2178, ¶ 18 (Sept. 24, 2014)
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particularly those related to global-digital crime, high degrees of
coordination along two dimensions are necessary. First, without global
coordination between states, the domestic effort of imposing such a
reporting duty on the private sector would be futile in detecting globaldigital crime, which can easily displace itself to legal-loophole states.
Thus, it is essential to establish global regulation of a “duty to report
crime.” Second, mutual coordination between government and choke
point private actors is crucial to preventing information-loopholes. Since
choke point private actors’ “duty to report crime” currently consists of
one-way bottom-up cooperation, global regulation of a “duty to report
crime” should involve the responsibility of the government—namely, topdown cooperation of providing governmental crime information to choke
point private actors—to shift the burden to the choke point private actors
to work as frontline officers instead of government authorities.
In most domestic jurisdictions, including France, financial
institutions (unlike airlines) are required to report suspicious activities.
The terrorists in our hypothetical must have therefore used stolen
passports to evade detection by the financial institutions by hiding their
identity as known terrorists. If the information on the SLTD database had
been shared with financial institutions, these hypothetical terrorist acts
could have been detected and deterred at the initial stage of the terrorist
plot. Although France was not a legal-loophole jurisdiction, the financial
institution in France was an information-loophole abused by the terrorists.
This Article illustrates the international instantaneous sharing regime
as an ideal regime for the global regulation of a “duty to report crime” to
meet the above conditions. In addition, it suggests three criteria—
horizontal accountability, vertical accountability, and proportionality to
privacy/reputational harm—each of which is to be met, depending on the
types of governmental information shared with choke point private actors
by employing proper institutional and procedural manners.
As contemporary global regulations of a “duty to report crime” do
not provide their own regimes of governmental information sharing with
choke point private actors, the possible precedents comprising the current
architecture of governmental crime information sharing with choke point
private actors at the international level have been analyzed from the
perspective of the three criteria. Each of these precedents is optimized to
satisfy at least one, but not all three, criteria, except for information
channel 2 in Chart I.
If global regulation of a “duty to report crime” is to have a one-sizefits-all regime for international, instantaneous sharing that will encompass
all types of information, the regime should satisfy all three criteria. Thus,
the proposed regime would match information channel 2 in Chart I,
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wherein a global regulatory body would be established with two essential
functions: first, it would work as an international data center to consolidate
the governmental crime information and grant choke point private actors
direct access; and second, it would act as a supervisory body to review the
substance of the shared information and procedures of information
production with the authority to penalize noncompliance. Under this
unified structure, a global regulatory body would implement detailed
processes and technical solutions to allow choke point private actors to
access the database in the least intrusive manner.
So, is this just a pipedream?
Although it is in its embryonic stage, this proposal is more than just a
pipedream. INTERPOL’s I-Checkit program, adopted in 2015, enables
participating airlines to directly query the SLTD whose information has
been collected from participating member states. I-Checkit is the first and
only regime to follow this channel 2 information flow in Chart I.
Although INTERPOL does not play a supervisory role in the sense that it
does not hold states accountable for providing false information through
regular inspections and penalization, it nevertheless demonstrates the
practicability of channel 2 in Chart I as a way of sharing international
governmental information with choke point private actors. Considering
that I-Checkit allows airlines, who have no duty to report terrorist
activities, to directly access the SLTD, sharing of such international
governmental information with choke point private actors, governed by
global regulation of a “duty to report crime,” is already strongly justified
and, in the near future, should be firmly established.

